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RELATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
STEVEN R. MORRISON∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 “Relational criminal liability,” or one person’s criminal liability for the actions of another 
by way of a group of which both individuals are a part, generates a fundamental tension 
between collectivist and individualist approaches to liability. The collectivist approach, 
which reifies the group qua group, enables individuals to be liable for the acts of the group 
and the group to be liable for the acts of individuals. The individualist approach treats indi-
viduals qua individuals, holding them liable only for their own conduct. 
 This tension sounds both in moral philosophy and legal theory. As to philosophy, Michael 
Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, and Christopher Kutz take an ultimately individualistic ap-
proach to assigning moral responsibility in a group context. John Searle, Raimo Tuomela, 
and others posit irreducible collective bodies, capable of intent and agency distinct from those 
of their individual members. As to legal theory, long-standing American legal norms treat 
individuals as individuals, whereas work by George P. Fletcher and, more recently, Gideon 
Yaffe and Jens David Ohlin suggest a collectivist turn. 
 This unresolved tension produces inconsistency, unpredictability, and normative failures 
in the determination of relational criminal liability. This Article relieves that tension by 
showing, through an exposition of the relevant moral philosophy, legal theory, and case law, 
that an individualist approach best accounts for the concerns of collectivists and individual-
ists alike. This account details the normative contours of relational criminal liability and 
addresses legitimate concerns with that liability. Finally, it develops a normative test for 
relational criminal liability and applies that test to a taxonomy of relational criminal liabil-
ity, which includes the many theories of liability that fall under the relational label. It con-
cludes that most, but not all, aspects of relational criminal liability are normatively justified 
and that many of its criticisms are better understood as aimed not at the substantive liability 
itself but at external failures that sound in procedure, interpretation, and sentencing. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 When is it justified to impose criminal liability on one individual for 
the acts of another individual? When the individuals have no relation-
ship, the answer is easy: never.1 But when these two people are con-
nected in relevant ways, the question of liability is live. It is also un-
answered in any sustained way.2 This Article proposes to provide such 
an answer. 
 The connection between the two people that this Article considers 
begins with what I call a ‘purposive collective,’ which I define as ‘a col-
lective that two or more individuals are a part of and by which the 
individuals share some mutual intent to produce, or mutual awareness 
of the potential for producing, some set of outcomes.’ Purposive collec-
tives do not, on their own, inevitably generate criminal liability. They 
do, however, entail potential liability because of the possibility of some 
shared mens rea and actus reus. 
 Consider the hypothetical case of Chris and Meghan: they own a 
home together, agree to paint it together, and further agree that Chris 
will buy the paint and Meghan will buy the brushes. This makes them 
engaged in a purposive collective, the intended outcomes of which are 
to buy the paint, buy the brushes, and paint the house. 
 What if Meghan stole the brushes and Chris stole the paint? Would 
each be criminally liable for the other’s criminal conduct? It’s not clear; 
it would depend, for example, on whether one knew of or instructed 
the other to commit the criminal act, or whether that other did so en-
tirely on her own. While the Pinkerton doctrine might address this 
specific question, the question also reflects a broader category of lia-
bility, which I call ‘relational criminal liability’ (‘relational liability’ for 
                                                                                                                      
 1. ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON AND HISTORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
CRIMINAL LAW 163 (3d ed. 2014) (Where “the relationship [between two people] has no pre-
existing legal basis, there is no duty to act. A man is not a murderer because he omitted to 
relieve a beggar even if there was the clearest proof that the beggar’s death resulted from 
the omission.”). 
 2. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 188 (1998) (“How one per-
son can become complicitous in the acts of another is by no means obvious.”). 
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short) and define as ‘one person’s criminal liability for the actions of 
another by way of joint membership in a purposive collective.’  
 Relational liability is comprised of many crimes and theories of lia-
bility: Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) kingpin liability, co-con-
spirator liability for conspiracy or its target offence, aiding and abet-
ting, accessory, Pinkerton, natural and probable consequences, RICO 
conspiracy, vicarious responsibility, co-schemer liability, joint venture 
theory, and combinations of these theories. Many of these bases of lia-
bility can be expressed either as formal charges or mere theories of 
liability for other crimes. This Article defines the normative boundary 
of this system of liability.3 
 This definition depends upon resolving a fundamental philosophi-
cal and legal tension between collectivist and individualist accounts of 
moral responsibility or legal liability.4 As to philosophy, Michael Brat-
man, Margaret Gilbert, and Christopher Kutz5 have taken an individ-
ualist approach to moral responsibility that locates intent and agency 
in individuals acting in groups. John Searle, Raimo Tuomela, and oth-
ers posit irreducible collective bodies, capable of intent and agency dis-
tinct from those of their individual members. As to law, long-standing 
American legal norms treat individuals as individuals, whereas work 
                                                                                                                       
 3. This Article is also not about ‘guilt by association’ or ‘collective responsibility.’ Guilt 
by association, properly understood, is a term used to discuss any negative inference drawn 
against an individual merely for her association with unpopular others. Criminal conspiracy, 
for example, does not entail guilt by association because it is based on more than mere asso-
ciation—it requires a criminal agreement. Collective responsibility refers to the questions of 
whether an individual should be liable for the actions of her group, see Thomas R. Flynn, 
Collective Responsibility and Obedience to the Law, 18 GA. L. REV. 845, 847 (1984), or 
whether the group should be liable for the actions of an individual. Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1204 (1985). In American 
law, these concepts are universally rejected; the former because guilt by mere association 
stresses American social norms and the First Amendment, and the latter because American 
law (with an exception for corporations, In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 83, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1989)), 
has never recognized groups as entities subject to criminal sanction. 
 4. George P. Fletcher, Law, in JOHN SEARLE 85, 99 (Barry Smith ed. 2003) [hereinafter 
Law] (“Legal theory has long struggled with the problem of collective intentions . . . .”). 
 5. I recognize that Bratman and Gilbert, along with Raimo Tuomela and John Searle, 
provide the “four most influential theories of collective intentionality.” Sara Rachel Chant et 
al., Introduction: Beyond the Big Four and the Big Five, in FROM INDIVIDUAL TO COLLECTIVE 
INTENTIONALITY: NEW ESSAYS 1, 1 (2014). I do not apply the theories of Tuomela and Searle 
in this Article because they, in contrast to Bratman’s and Gilbert’s individualistic approach 
to collective intentionality, posit an irreducible collective intentionality, above and separate 
from that of individual collective members. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL 
REALITY 23 (1995). For the same reason, I do not apply Philip Pettit and Christian List’s 
thinking. See CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, 
AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 19 (2011). Collective intentionality, while it may be true 
philosophically, is not useful to evaluate relational criminal liability, which, as an aspect of 
American criminal law, must normatively be based on an individual’s mens rea. 
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by George P. Fletcher6 and, more recently, Gideon Yaffe7 and Jens Da-
vid Ohlin8 suggest a collectivist turn. 
 Broadly, this matters because the collectivist approach and the in-
dividualist approach each generates different initial presumptions of 
liability: A collectivist would be likely to hold Chris and Meghan liable 
for each other’s conduct subject to facts that defeat such liability, 
whereas an individualist would presume no liability without facts that 
establish it. 
 Neither collectivists nor individualists are categorical, and so a 
more nuanced theory of liability is possible. This Article shows that an 
individualist approach best accounts for the concerns of collectivists 
and individualists alike.9 Its nuance entails revisiting the concepts of 
mens rea, actus reus, and causation. As to mens rea, this Article advo-
cates for liability where a defendant is reckless or worse,10 informed in 
part by H.L.A. Hart’s “role-responsibility” concept.11 As to actus reus, 
it finds the defendant’s requisite conduct, in part, in what Michael 
Moore refers to as acting to cause a particular state of affairs that gives 
rise to another’s conduct,12 and in Douglas Husak’s control principle,13 
which provides another reasonable alternative to traditional actus 
                                                                                                                      
 6. George P. Fletcher, Collective Guilt and Collective Punishment, 5 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 163, 168 (2004) [hereinafter Collective Guilt]; Fletcher, Law, supra note 4, at 99-100. 
 7. See generally Gideon Yaffe, Collective Intentionality in the Law, in THE 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY (Marija Yankovic & Kirk Ludvig, 
eds., forthcoming 2016) (positing that “several criminal law doctrines which justifiably man-
date punishment do so in a way that can be adequately explained only by attributing the law 
with a supporting theory of collective intentionality”). 
 8. Jens David Ohlin, Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason, 98 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 147, 151 (2007) [hereinafter Group Think]. 
 9. Alan Norrie’s quasi-Marxist account of the criminal law illustrates this point well. 
Individualism, of course, offers the promise of retributivist justice based on liability only 
where there is culpability, but Norrie seeks justice through a communal lens. NORRIE, supra 
note 1, at 17-23. He wrote: “The present law of omissions with its narrow confines has its 
roots in the nineteenth century’s stubborn refusal to imagine relations and duties between 
people save on the narrow basis of a cash or contractual [relationship].” Id. at 157. This has 
led to injustice for “social actors.” Id. at 30. This Article suggests, however, that it is the 
criminal law’s attention to collectivism, rather than its dedication to individualism, that has 
generated unjust assignments of liability. A turn to an individualist account of liability in 
the context of a collective can protect individuals both as individuals and as “social actors,” 
or those who act in a group. 
 10. LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A 
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 31, 41 (2009). 
 11. H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 213 (2d ed. 2008). 
 12. MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, 
AND METAPHYSICS 17 (2009). 
 13. DOUGLAS HUSAK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 17, 36-41 (1987). 
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reus. Finally, the Article jettisons the causation requirement. Apply-
ing the work of Hart and Tony Honoré,14 Moore, and others, causation 
emerges as normatively unnecessary to ground liability15 and imprac-
ticable in the relational liability context. 
 Ultimately, a defendant may appropriately be relationally liable for 
the conduct of another person in a purposive collective when the de-
fendant acts or refrains from acting with (1) the intent to facilitate the 
other’s conduct; (2) knowledge that her action or omission from action 
will more likely than not facilitate the other’s conduct; or (3) reckless 
disregard for the substantial likelihood that her conduct or omission 
from acting will facilitate the other’s action.16 This normative and re-
tributivist test, while primarily individualist, accounts for the unique 
reality of multiple-person criminal conduct.17 
 Resolving the collectivist-individualist tension and drawing the 
normative contours of relational liability is practically important for 
three reasons. 
 First, the crimes and theories that comprise relational liability ap-
pear pervasively in the American criminal justice system.18 Second, 
courts focus on and easily reject the separate concepts of guilt by asso-
ciation and collective responsibility.19 Because of this particular focus, 
they discount the influence of run-of-the-mill relational liability and 
                                                                                                                       
 14. H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985). 
 15. Alexander and Ferzan would apparently jettison the causation requirement for all 
criminal liability, not just relational liability. ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 10, at 3. 
 16. I acknowledge that this test for relational liability appears to undermine traditional 
omissions law, namely that individuals are not legally and should not normatively be re-
sponsible for the actions of another where they do not act vis-à-vis the other’s actions. I ad-
dress this in detail infra Section III.e. I also leave aside the question whether each of these 
theories of liability should generate the same or different degrees of blameworthiness and 
punishment. I consider that question to be external to the structure of relational liability 
and address it infra Section V.c. 
 17. Deborah Tollefsen might claim that this test “involve[s] the postulation of a set of 
individual intentions (or attitudes of a certain sort) that have a common content and are 
interrelated in specific ways.” Deborah Tollefsen, A Dynamic Theory of Shared Intention and 
the Phenomenology of Joint Action, in FROM INDIVIDUAL TO COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY: 
NEW ESSAYS 13, 13 (2014). 
 18. United States v. Reynolds, 919 F.2d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 1990) (explaining that con-
spiracy charges are “inevitable because prosecutors seem to have conspiracy on their word 
processors as Count I; rare is the case omitting such a charge”); Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis 
D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A Critical Examination, 52 ALB. L. REV. 
637, 640 (1988) (“It is common for the same person to be sued both as a primary violator and 
as an aider-abettor. It is not uncommon for a person to be held liable in both capacities.”); 
Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1310 (2003) (suggesting that 
more than 25% of all federal criminal prosecutions and a large number of state cases involved 
prosecutions for conspiracy). 
 19. Which I discuss in detail infra Part II; see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 
750, 772 (1946) (“Guilt with us remains individual and personal . . . . It is not a matter of 
mass application.”); United States v. Polasek, 162 F.3d 878 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
DeDominicis, 332 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1964). 
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therefore implicitly embrace a broad application of that liability.20 
Third, players in the American criminal justice system readily, and 
often irrationally, read multiple-person criminal conduct as the unified 
work of a cohesive entity, which permits expansive, but often unrea-
sonable, relational liability.21 
 Part II of this Article contextualizes its thesis by defining guilt by 
association and collective responsibility and then moves to a descrip-
tion of relational liability. Part III provides a basis, grounded in phi-
losophy and legal theory, for the Article’s approach to mens rea, actus 
reus, and causation regarding relational liability. It also sets forth the 
normative test for such liability and addresses legitimate concerns in-
volving omissions law and the defense of abandonment. Part IV estab-
lishes the concrete structure of relational liability and evaluates it 
against the test established in Part III. It concludes that most, but not 
all, theories of such liability are normatively defensible. Part V rounds 
the Article out, highlighting failures of procedure, proof, and compar-
ative culpability that are external to the substantive structure of rela-
tional liability and negatively affect its operation. 
II.   FROM GUILT BY ASSOCIATION TO RELATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 American criminal law has confronted three different versions of 
liability involving collectives: guilt by association, collective responsi-
bility, and relational liability. The law categorically rejects the first 
two, but a summary discussion of them is important to understanding 
the third. 
A.   Guilt by Association 
 The law categorically rejects guilt by association,22 which entails 
liability based on mere association with a criminal individual or group, 
                                                                                                                      
 20. Conspiracy may be proven by inference arising from a defendant’s single act, even 
if the defendant knew only one other member of the conspiracy. United States v. Huezo, 546 
F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 2008). On largely the same evidence, a defendant may be found guilty 
of aiding and abetting, in addition to conspiracy. United States v. Cowart, 595 F.2d 1023, 
1030-31 (5th Cir. 1979). And such conduct can give rise to expansive and borderless Pinker-
ton liability. United States v. Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67 n.3 (D. Mass. 2003). 
 21. Definitions triggering group liability can be difficult to apply. For example, one gov-
ernment agent has defined “street gang” as “an association of three or more individuals who 
collectively identify themselves by adopting a group identity.” United States v. Norwood, 16 
F. Supp. 3d 848, 855 (E.D. Mich. 2014). In another case, a violation of a regulation against 
assembly in a National Forest was alleged against a group “composed of citizens who are 
loosely affiliated.” United States v. McFadden, 71 F. Supp. 2d 962, 964 (W.D. Mo. 1999). 
 22. For example, David Cole and James X. Dempsey refer to the “unconstitutional” 
principle of guilt by association. DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 58-64 (2003); DAVID COLE & JAMES 
X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME 
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and nothing more. The Supreme Court, for example, in Holder v. Hu-
manitarian Law Project23 (HLP) countenanced individuals’ member-
ship in foreign terrorist organizations—as long as they did not do an-
ything to support that organization.24 And in Gallo v. Acuna25 the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court upheld injunctions against gang members for 
assembling together not because of the associational value of their as-
sembly but because their “activities [were] directed in the main at traf-
ficking in illegal drugs and securing control of the community through 
systematic acts of intimidation and violence.”26  
 To be sure, as to HLP, membership rights without the ability to 
support the group of which one is a member seem illusory. And as to 
Gallo, the question of an injunction against assembly prior to the com-
mission of crime by individuals suggests an unconstitutional prior re-
straint on assembly rights.27 But the aspirational statement that both 
of these courts make is that guilt by mere association, without any 
evaluation of mens rea, actus reus, causation, or criminality in gen-
eral, is not acceptable. 
 The rejection of guilt by association has, however, remained of lim-
ited force because it is usually based either on attention to rare, high-
profile political cases28 or on an unclear and expansive definition of 
guilt by association. Guilt by association is invoked, for example, to 
criticize some criminal investigations,29 DNA databases,30 automobile 
                                                                                                                       
OF NATIONAL SECURITY 121 (2d ed. 2006). Jens David Ohlin bases criminal liability on “col-
lective intentions” arising from “group deliberations,” but argues that “no adequate theory 
explains how the act and intention of one conspirator can be attributed to another, simply 
by virtue of their criminal agreement.” Ohlin, Group Think, supra note 8, at 147. And the 
Supreme Court has declared that guilt by association “has no place” in the criminal law. 
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966). 
 23. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 24. Id. at 25-26 (2010) (The law “ ‘does not prevent [people] from becoming members 
of the PKK and LTTE or impose any sanction on them for doing so’ . . . . Congress has  
not . . . sought to suppress ideas or opinions in the form of ‘pure political speech.’ Rather, 
Congress has prohibited ‘material support.’ ” (citations omitted)). 
 25. 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997). 
 26. Id. at 608. 
 27. See John Inazu, Unlawful Assembly as Social Control 6 (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
 28. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982); Elfbrandt, 384 
U.S. at 19; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 178 (1951); Am. 
Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 433 (1950). 
 29. Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance 
and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 625 (2004). 
 30. Frederick R. Bieber & David Lazer, Guilt by Association; Should the Law Be Able 
to Use One Person’s DNA to Carry out Surveillance on Their Family? Not Without a Public 
Debate Say Frederick Bieber and David Lazer, NEW SCI., Oct. 23, 2004, at 20. 
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searches,31 and gang databases.32 Both the blinkered former approach 
and borderless latter approach risk the use of guilt by association as a 
trope to refer simply to cases that someone doesn’t like.33 
 Some views of guilt by association are more nuanced because they 
justify liability for association where the defendant acts vis-à-vis the 
association in a way that justifies liability.34 
 For example, Bobby Chesney refers to conspiracy as “criminalized 
association,” and contrasts this to “vicarious punishment.”35 It appears 
that, for Chesney, the latter may be normatively appropriate but the 
former is not, since it leads to punishment “not for any specific conduct 
by [one person], but for associat[ion] with” that person.36 But conspir-
acy liability is more than mere association; it entails a criminal agree-
ment formed intentionally. Chesney’s take, therefore, differs from the 
one this Article advances. He focuses on the First Amendment associ-
ational aspect of a collective, not the relational liability that can arise 
from that association. While I share Chesney’s practical concern with 
prosecuting conspiracies,37 this Article is meant to trace the theoretical 
justifications for relational liability. 
 Christopher Yoo discussed the guilt by association inherent in an-
tigang injunctions when the criteria for injunctions included whether 
someone admitted to gang membership, bore a gang tattoo, or was 
even an active participant in a gang.38 For Yoo, however, injunctions 
do not constitute guilt by association where they are based on inten-
tional and active participation in illegal gang activities.39 
 As another example, Brian Comerford rejects critiques of the mate-
rial support for terrorism statute, explaining that “the law does not 
                                                                                                                      
 31. David E. Edwards et al., Case Comment, Criminal Law—United States v. Bell: Reject-
ing Guilt by Association in Search and Seizure Cases, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 258, 258 (1986). 
 32. Joshua D. Wright, The Constitutional Failure of Gang Databases, 2 STAN. J. CIV. 
RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 115, 130 (2005). 
 33. Note, Guilt by Association: Three Words in Search of a Meaning, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 
148, 160 (1949). 
 34. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982); Scales v. United 
States, 367 U.S. 203, 227 (1961); Thomas I. Emerson & David M. Helfeld, Loyalty Among 
Government Employees, 58 YALE L.J. 1, 138 (1948). 
 35. Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The 
Guilt by Association Critique, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1408, 1434 (2003). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Steven R. Morrison, Conspiracy Law’s Threat to Free Speech, 15 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 865 (2013) [hereinafter Conspiracy Law’s Threat]. 
 38. Christopher S. Yoo, The Constitutionality of Enjoining Criminal Street Gangs as 
Public Nuisances, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 212, 234 (1994). 
 39. See id. at 233. 
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criminalize association with, but rather support of, terrorist organiza-
tions.”40 In contrast to Chesney, who stresses the First Amendment 
associational problems with charges like conspiracy—and who has dis-
cussed these problems in the material support context41—Comerford 
discounts the patent conflict between criminal liability and First 
Amendment associational rights generated by the HLP opinion.42 And 
as HLP suggests, courts have not taken seriously the line of associa-
tional liability established in N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware43 and 
Scales v. United States.44 
 There is, furthermore, an aspect of impracticality in Comerford’s 
comment, since to associate with a group is virtually synonymous with 
supporting it. And the government has not been eager to split this hair 
when it comes to assigning criminal liability: In HLP, government at-
torneys suggested that a lawyer who files an amicus brief in support 
of a foreign terrorist organization could be liable for material sup-
port.45 Once again, however, my purpose in this article is not to trace 
the tension between relational liability and associational or other First 
Amendment rights. It is, rather, to advance a theoretical argument 
about the justifiable scope of relational liability. 
 Criticism of guilt by association is both too narrow and too broad. It 
is too narrow when it is used to condemn the application of criminal 
law only in rare, high-profile political cases. This ignores the pervasive 
use of association in run-of-the-mill criminal cases. It is too broad 
when it is used to condemn all sorts of governmental action, including 
criminal investigations and forming levels of suspicion, when that ac-
tion refers to groups or associations, even when the reference is rele-
vant. In the end, the concept of guilt by association isn’t very helpful 
because it serves to condemn obviously unjustifiable forms of liability 
(those based on mere association), and it says little about other forms 
of liability (those based on association plus something else) that may 
or may not be defensible. 
                                                                                                                       
 40. Brian P. Comerford, Preventing Terrorism by Prosecuting Material Support, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 723, 734 (2005). 
 41. Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Chal-
lenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425 (2007). 
 42. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (holding that associat-
ing with foreign terrorist organizations in order to provide them with support for peaceful 
and law-abiding activities constituted the federal crime of providing material support to  
terrorist organizations). 
 43. 458 U.S. 886, 886-87 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment protects one’s asso-
ciation with a criminal group, as long as the individual engages in no criminal conduct nor 
contributes to others’ criminal conduct). 
 44. 367 U.S. 203, 227 (1961) (providing a test for the extent of First Amendment asso-
ciational rights in the context of a criminal group). 
 45. John D. Inazu, Advocacy and Association, 2013 UTAH L. REV. ONLAW 1 (2013). 
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B.   Collective Responsibility 
 Collective responsibility—the responsibility of a group for the acts 
of an individual or of an individual for the acts of a group—has long 
been used to govern small communities46 and to refer to the moral im-
perative of nations and other groups to respond to major crises.47 The 
notion of collective responsibility as a basis for criminal liability, how-
ever, emerged in the United States only in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury.48 Joel Feinberg, for example, in 1968, considered liability for con-
spiracy, aiding and abetting, and other forms of relational criminal li-
ability, but framed his work as one of collective responsibility, writing 
of the responsibility of “the whole group . . . for the actions of one or 
some of its members.”49  
 Corporate criminal liability is an expression of collective responsi-
bility50 because it entails liability of corporations and other legal enti-
ties for the crimes of their individual employees and agents.51 Individ-
uals whose conduct gives rise to corporate criminal liability may also 
                                                                                                                      
 46. Albert W. Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishment of Corporations: Of Frank-
pledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. REV. 307, 312 (1991) (“The institution of Frankpledge in medi-
eval England held all members of a group responsible for a crime committed by one of them.”); 
Robert A. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 201 (1932) (noting “the intensely local character of early legal systems, including the fact 
of collective responsibility of the community for acts done within its borders”). 
 47. Myer Cohen, International Government. By Clyde Eagleton. New York: The Ronald 
Press Co. 1932, 43 YALE L.J. 518, 519 (1934); George H. Dession, Psychiatry and the Condi-
tioning of Criminal Justice, 47 YALE L.J. 319, 331 (1938); C.D.P., Present Day Labor Litiga-
tion, 31 YALE L.J. 86, 87 (1921). 
 48. Possibly the first substantial mentions of collective responsibility as a theory of 
criminal liability were implied in a 1940 Yale Law Review article, Morris R. Cohen, Moral 
Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1007 (1940), and a 1941 Harvard Law Review 
article, Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L. 
REV. 44, 59 (1941). But see Lamb v. People, 96 Ill. 73, 82 (1880), in which a trial court per-
mitted a jury to find a defendant guilty on a collective responsibility theory. The Illinois 
Supreme Court held this was error, requiring a connection more than mere membership in 
the same group to assign liability. 
 49. Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. PHIL. 674, 677 (1968). 
 50. Corporate liability as collective responsibility was not a foregone conclusion; theo-
rists in the early twentieth century “debated whether corporations are just groups of people 
or actually constitute distinct entities separate from their members.” Mihailis E. Diamantis, 
Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2049, 2053 (2016). 
 51. United States v. Agosto-Vega, 617 F.3d 541, 552-53 (1st Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1118-19 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Singh, 
518 F.3d 236, 249 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 550, 560 (8th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Investment Enters., Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660 (2d Cir. 1989); United States 
v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 822-23 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877-
78 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 941-42 (6th Cir. 1963). As a striking 
example, prosecutors in the 2002 prosecution of the corporation Arthur Anderson had to 
prove only that “any one of Anderson’s 28,000 U.S. employees” withheld or destroyed docu-
ments. Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Ander-
sen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 108 (2006). 
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be individually charged with a substantive crime,52 and they may be 
charged with a relational crime, such as conspiracy.53 They may even be 
charged with aiding and abetting the corporation itself.54 These various 
theories of liability can get quite confusing; this Article clarifies the sit-
uation by setting corporate liability aside as an embodiment of collective 
responsibility and focusing on relational liability, or liability that one 
individual might be assigned for the conduct of another individual.  
 While the notion of collective responsibility in American law ex-
tended beyond the corporate realm,55 it for the most part attended pri-
marily to state-sponsored crime in international law and the law of 
war.56 Most recently, the concept has been applied in the International 
Criminal Court and was most salient in the Tadic case from the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which intro-
duced the crime of Joint Criminal Enterprise.57 It has had virtually no 
influence on run-of-the-mill American criminal cases.58 
 Around 1990, philosophers began to produce sustained inquiries of 
collective responsibility.59 These inquiries engaged two questions. 
First, could a collective have an intent and engage in conduct distinct 
from the intent and conduct of its constituent members? Second, if it 
could, how should the moral responsibility of individuals involved in 
the intent and conduct of the collective be evaluated? These inquiries 
                                                                                                                       
 52. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 409 (1962) (“No intent to exculpate a corporate 
officer who violates the law is to be imputed to Congress without clear compulsion . . . .” 
(citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)). 
 53. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946); United States v. Clark, 717 
F.3d 790, 808-09 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sklena, 692 F.3d 725, 729-30 (7th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 547 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d in part and vac’d in 
part on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010); United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236, 252-53 
(4th Cir. 2008).  
 54. United States v. Sain, 141 F.3d 463, 474-75 (3d Cir. 1998) (“AEC, because it is a 
corporation, is a separate legal entity, even though Sain owned all the stock. Thus, it has the 
capacity of being aided and abetted.”). 
 55. See Gerald Dworkin, Doing and Deserving, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1317, 1322 (1971) (book 
review) (noting that Feinberg’s “essay on collective responsibility brings sociology, law, and 
philosophy to bear on an important and neglected issue”). 
 56. See Fletcher, Collective Guilt, supra note 6, at 168; Duane W. Layton, Forty Years 
After the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals: The Impact of the War Crimes Trials on Inter-
national and National Law, 80 AM. SOC’Y. INT’L L. PROC. 56, 63 (1986); see also Sanford Lev-
inson, Responsibility for Crimes of War, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 244, 245, 249-50 (1973) (con-
sidering the dilemma of individual criminal conduct in collective contexts, and pointing to  
domestic criminal law, including aiding and abetting and conspiracy, but focusing on  
war crimes). 
 57. Jens David Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes, 11 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 693, 697 (2011) [hereinafter Joint Intentions]. 
 58. Again, I leave aside corporate criminal liability as an area of law that is unique. See 
Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely Amer-
ican Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 Yale L.J. 126, 129-30 (2008). 
 59. See MARGARET GILBERT, JOINT COMMITMENT: HOW WE MAKE THE SOCIAL WORLD 
10 (2014). 
646  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:635 
   
sought primarily to construct a theory of collective agency, not to ac-
count for individual members’ moral responsibility for the acts of fel-
low collective members. These inquiries, furthermore, were aimed at 
determining an individual’s moral responsibility for the collective con-
duct, not criminal liability. The inquiry of relational criminal liability, 
then, departs from that of collective responsibility in two ways: it seeks 
to determine the scope of criminal liability, not moral responsibility, of 
one collective member for the conduct of another collective member, 
not for the conduct of the collective itself. 
 In a forthcoming book chapter, Gideon Yaffe addresses the question 
of collective intentionality in the criminal law.60 When “a person incurs 
criminal liability for something he did not do thanks to the fact that 
he is part of a group of people to whom [the act] is rightly attributed,”61 
Yaffe sees the potential for either a collectivist or an individualist re-
sponse to determining liability. The collectivist response presumes a 
“collective intentionality,” and the individualist response is based on 
the presumption that the defendant has “made an individual, inten-
tional causal contribution to the violation of a legally protected inter-
est.”62 Yaffe’s goal is to “adjudicate between” these positions.63 
 He prefers the collectivist response for two reasons. First, that ap-
proach “unites a group of individuals to which [a] crime . . . can be 
attributed.”64 If A (the actual actor) raped a victim (an action a) and D 
(the defendant who didn’t commit a but whose liability is in question65) 
held the victim down, according to Yaffe “it makes good sense to hold 
[A and D] criminally liable for that crime, rather than for some form 
of criminal aiding.”66 Second, Yaffe believes that the individualist po-
sition is fatally flawed because supporters of that position must choose 
between two untenable options: they must either deny that it is justi-
fied to hold D criminally liable for A’s action, or they must admit that 
D’s liability is not for A’s action itself, but for some distinct action, like 
aiding A’s action.67 In the end, for Yaffe, the collectivist position is su-
perior because it “allows us to say” that D “is criminally liable [for A’s 
action] because he was in on it.”68 
                                                                                                                      
 60. Yaffe, supra note 7 (manuscript at 3).  
 61. Id. (manuscript at 4). 
 62. Id. (manuscript at 8-9). 
 63. Id. (manuscript at 9). 
 64. Id. (manuscript at 10). 
 65. I will use the nomenclature D, A, and a throughout this Article to refer to the de-
fendant whose liability is in question (D), the actor whose conduct D might be liable for (A), 
and the conduct in question (a). 
 66. Yaffe, supra note 7 (manuscript at 10). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. (manuscript at 13). 
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C.   Relational Criminal Liability 
 Yaffe’s preference for the collectivist position seems to rest on two 
notions that I reject: that crime can be attributed to a group, separate 
from the group’s members, and that collectives can have their own in-
tentionality, separate from the intentionality of the collective’s mem-
bers. I prefer the individualist position, and there is a third option to 
Yaffe’s untenable two that individualists can adopt. His two options 
presume that to be liable, D must somehow cause (or, perhaps, con-
tribute to bringing about) a. Where A is the sole causer of a, D either 
cannot be liable (option one) or his liability cannot “be taken at face 
value [because i]t seems that we are holding [D] criminally liable for 
[a], but his actual crime is distinct; it is the crime of aiding” the com-
mission of a (option two).69 
 The third option, which this Article adopts, is to jettison the causa-
tion requirement for D and determine D’s liability for A’s a based on 
D’s actus reus and mens rea.70 This actus reus could be entirely 
acausal, at least as a scientific matter, as where D aids and abets A’s 
crime, or where D and A conspire to commit armed robbery, and in the 
course of the robbery A shoots someone.  
 This liability bridges the divide between collectivism and individu-
alism, which Yaffe seeks. It acknowledges both that individuals must 
be judged as individuals to determine their liability, pursuant to ac-
cepted criminal law norms, and it also acknowledges that individuals 
participate in collectives, and through that participation may contrib-
ute to others’ commission of criminal a’s.  
 To illustrate, consider two cases. In Commonwealth v. Azim,71 the 
defendant was the driver of a car conveying two other men.72 The three 
men spotted the victim; the defendant stopped the car, and the two 
other men exited the car to beat the victim. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
                                                                                                                       
 69. Id. (manuscript at 10). 
 70. One of Yaffe’s major concerns with relational criminal liability is the causation re-
quirement, and my rejection of its necessity. If D’s causation of a no longer needs to be 
proved, then the thorny problems involving causation remain, but they are just shifted to 
proving A’s causation of a. This problem is most salient when, for example, D and A have a 
shared scheme and someone is harmed as a result of that scheme, but the evidence does not 
show clearly that either D or A caused the harm. E-mail from Gideon Yaffe, Professor of Law, 
Philosophy, and Psychology, Yale Law School, to Steven R. Morrison, Assistant Professor of 
Law, University of North Dakota School of Law (Dec. 30, 2015, 11:29 CST) (on file with author).  
My theory of relational criminal liability does not propose to solve the scientific causation 
problem that Yaffe presents. It does, however, acknowledge Yaffe’s concern that someone 
must have caused a. That person is A, and relational liability focuses on D’s liability, which 
does not require causation. This approach works even where, for example, A might have 
committed an “inchoate” crime such as attempt. While no harm will have been caused by 
anyone, A will have caused the crime of attempt. I presume that it follows that a D who aided 
the attempt may be liable for aiding in the commission of that crime. 
 71. 459 A.2d 1244 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). 
 72. Id. at 1245.  
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Court held that this evidence was sufficient to ground a conviction for 
conspiracy to batter.73 And in Commonwealth v. Cook,74 the defendant 
was convicted of conspiracy to commit rape because his friend actually 
raped the victim, and the defendant held his friend’s belt while his 
friend raped the victim.75 A Massachusetts appellate court held that the 
evidence was insufficient as to the defendant’s rape charge.76 
 Although each case generated a different outcome despite similar 
facts, these cases can be viewed as consistent with each other and nor-
matively grounded by evaluating the individual defendants’ mens rea 
and actus reus in the context of a purposive collective. In Azim, the 
Pennsylvania court found that the defendant could be liable because 
he was the driver and because he was aware of the actual perpetrators’ 
intentions to beat the victim.77 And in Cook, the Massachusetts court 
found that the defendant engaged in no actus reus toward the crime of 
conspiracy, nor did he have any requisite mens rea, being apparently 
unaware of the actual rapist’s plan until its execution.78  
 In the end, the approach that this Article takes is not as divergent 
from Yaffe’s approach as it seems because his thesis isn’t one that re-
jects individualism but rather one that embraces collectivism in order 
to make sense of the problem he has with claiming that a D who does 
not cause a is held by a guilty verdict to have committed a.79  
 While I acknowledge this problem, an individualist account of rela-
tional criminal liability has four major advantages over Yaffe’s ap-
proach. As a matter of philosophic fact, individualist relational liabil-
ity rejects what I claim to be the fiction of collective intentionality.80 
As a criminal normative matter, it treats all defendants as individuals 
for purposes of assigning liability, as American criminal law requires. 
As a matter of criminal procedure, it requires prosecutors to prove an 
individual D’s guilt and discourages a conviction based on D’s guilt by 
                                                                                                                      
 73. Id. at 1247. 
 74. 411 N.E.2d 1326 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). 
 75. Id. at 1328. 
 76. Id. at 1329. 
 77. Azim, 459 A.2d at 1247. 
 78. Cook, 411 N.E.2d at 1329. To be sure, based on the defendant’s actus reus and mens 
rea, the court held that the defendant could be implicated in the rape as an accomplice, Id. 
at 1330, which seems to me to be the correct result. 
 79. Yaffe acknowledges that D can be liable for A’s a because D was “in on it,” but to 
say that D actually committed a is factually wrong. If A stole and D helped, D did not ‘steal,’ 
but D can be “attributed with” the stealing. Yaffe, supra note 7 (manuscript at 13, 16). For 
Yaffe, the collectivist position allows for a more semantically honest attribution of liability. 
 80. Kirk Ludwig, Is Distributed Cognition Group Level Cognition?, 1 J. SOC. ONTOLOGY 
189, 190 (2015) (explaining that there is “no reason to think that extant forms of distributed 
cognition involving groups of cognizers solving problems or performing tasks are instances 
of group level cognitive processes”); see also infra, Section III.a. 
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association with a potential criminal group. Finally, individualist re-
lational criminal liability addresses the problem with claiming that “D 
committed a,” where A actually committed a. Relational liability does 
so by rejecting this fiction and holding D responsible only for her own 
actus reus and mens rea vis-à-vis A in a way that connects D to a such 
that D’s liability (for aiding and abetting, conspiring, or whatever) is 
justified. Yaffe wants the law to recognize the distinction between 
“stealing” (what A does) and “being responsible for stealing” (what D 
does).81 Individualist relational liability acknowledges that distinction; 
Yaffe’s collective approach moves away from that because it conflates 
two individuals into one causal entity. 
 The sustained philosophical debate between collectivists and indi-
vidualists82 has led Tracy Isaacs to advocate for a two-level analysis 
that considers both individual- and group-level agency.83 While Isaacs 
may be correct as a philosophical matter—especially, perhaps, as her 
thinking might apply to moral evaluations of massive wrongs like gen-
ocide84—Jens David Ohlin, who is sympathetic to but skeptical of 
Isaacs’ theory, sees three practical problems. First, positing collective 
agency will render individuals either morally or legally not responsible 
or responsible, both as individuals and as collective members.85 Thus, 
individuals will either be let off the hook or will be, potentially, as-
signed too much responsibility for their conduct. Second, it is simply 
unclear what it means to hold collectives criminally responsible at the 
collective level.86 Collective responsibility is, in other words, easier to 
assign in theory than in reality. Third, Ockham’s razor87 suggests a 
strong preference for a solely individualist approach rather than a 
more complex two-level analysis that includes a collective entity.88 
 So, as a philosophical matter, Isaacs may be correct, but practicality 
requires something else. Recognizing the individualist grounding of 
relational criminal liability responds to both Isaacs’ philosophy and 
Ohlin’s plea for a more workable approach. Relational liability recog-
nizes that individuals act in collectives but retain individual agency 
                                                                                                                       
 81. Ludwig, supra note 80. 
 82. Jens David Ohlin, The One or the Many, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 285, 287 (2015) [here-
inafter One or Many]. 
 83. TRACY ISAACS, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN COLLECTIVE CONTEXTS 97-129 (2012). 
 84. Ohlin, One or Many, supra note 82, at 289-90. 
 85. Id. at 289. 
 86. Id. at 296-97. 
 87. Ockham’s razor is a philosophical principle that “gives precedence to simplicity: of 
two competing theories, the simpler explanation of an entity is to be preferred.” Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Occam’s Razor, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Occams-razor (last updated 
June 4, 2015). 
 88. Ohlin, One or Many, supra note 82, at 287. 
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and can be judged entirely as individuals. I make no claim that collec-
tive agency exists or does not exist as a philosophical truth; rather, I 
contend that an individualist account of relational criminal liability is 
possible89 and preferable since it aligns most closely with the criminal 
law norm of individual liability and discourages normatively unac-
ceptable guilt by association. 
 Ohlin takes a different tack, positing the existence of group inten-
tionality through which one group member’s conduct may be attribut-
able to another. “Simply put,” he writes, “if one member of the group 
commits an action that is caused by the group’s intention to commit 
the crime, it is plausible to attribute the act to the group itself, and by 
reverse extension, back down to each of its members.”90 
 For Ohlin, this group intent-based form of liability can apply only 
to tightly knit conspiracies and only for acts that are within the scope 
of the criminal agreement91 because only such groups will embody the 
shared intent to commit such acts necessary for liability. Thus, any 
form of Pinkerton that imposes liability based on a mens rea less than 
intent is not justifiable.92 Such liability, for Ohlin, “elude[s] coherent 
explanation”93 and is indefensible except on utilitarian grounds.94 
 An individualist account, which requires a mens rea of recklessness 
or worse, provides that explanation in the form of a retributivist cri-
tique of relational liability and, ultimately, a defense of most of its as-
pects. Instead of tracing liability from A through a group’s collective 
intent to D, I account for liability via a direct A-to-D analysis. Just as 
Margaret Thatcher once proclaimed, “there’s no such thing as soci-
ety,”95 this account has no need of a group intent to mediate A and D’s 
individual intents and provide for D’s liability for A’s conduct.  
 This approach has three advantages over Ohlin’s. First, it applies 
to all collectives, tightly knit or otherwise, and so it dispenses with the 
fraught requirement of determining whether a group is tightly knit 
enough to form a group intent. Second, any theory of group intent risks 
guilt by association by imposing liability on D for A’s acts without a 
                                                                                                                      
 89. In this, I differ from Ohlin’s tentative opinion that collective intentionality is irre-
ducible to individuals’ intents, but we ultimately converge on a middle ground that promises 
a practicable theory by which to assign criminal liability. Ohlin, Joint Intentions, supra note 
57, at 738. 
 90. Ohlin, Group Think, supra note 8 at 155. 
 91. Id. at 151. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 153. 
 94. Id. at 159.  
 95. Margaret Thatcher: A Life in Quotes, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/apr/08/margaret-thatcher-quotes [https://perma.cc/ 
R6BE-6BRC]. 
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thoroughgoing individualist inquiry into D’s individual culpability. 
This individualist approach avoids that risk. Third, it provides a de-
fense of co-conspirator liability that responds to criminal law theory, 
which Ohlin notes is lacking.96 
III.   CRIMINAL LAW NORMS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF  
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 
 While a broad array of background norms support criminal law,97 the 
structure of relational liability can be evaluated primarily by reference 
to three commonly accepted requirements to ground individualist liabil-
ity: mens rea, actus reus, and causation. The test for relational liability 
this Part sets forth is based on a reevaluation of these requirements. 
 This reevaluation generates a normative test for relational liability 
that includes novel interpretations of the mens rea and actus reus re-
quirements and a complete jettisoning of the causation requirement. 
Indeed, causation and the need to jettison it inheres throughout this 
Part’s discussion of mens rea and actus reus. These interpretations 
respond to the structural exigencies of relational liability while re-
maining tethered to norms of criminal liability as expressed in more 
traditional views of mens rea, actus reus, and causation. 
 The test does so by drawing a unified thread through the work of 
legal scholars and moral philosophers. H.L.A. Hart’s “role-responsibil-
ity” concept98 and the philosophers’ focus on individual mens rea, cou-
pled with Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan’s as well as Jerome 
Hall’s defenses of recklessness as a sufficient mens rea99 (where that 
recklessness relates to the criminal result, not merely to a D’s general 
effect on someone else) provide a workable account of mens rea in the 
context of relational liability. Moore’s work on the actus reus of caus-
ing a particular state of affairs100 (seconded by Douglas Husak’s control 
principle101) and his thoughts on accomplice liability do triple duty: 
                                                                                                                       
 96. Ohlin, Group Think, supra note 8, at 150. 
 97. These include retributivist, deterrence, and utilitarian principles; proportionality; 
desert; individual culpability; the rule of lenity; the harm principle; liability based on human 
agency, Benjamin L. Berger, Emotions and the Veil of Voluntarism: The Loss of Judgment 
in Canadian Criminal Defenses, 51 MCGILL L.J. 99, 103 (2006), or human control, HART, 
supra note 11, at 210, and reference to community values and beliefs. Joel Feinberg, The 
Expressive Function of Punishment, in WHY PUNISH? HOW MUCH? A READER ON 
PUNISHMENT 113 (Michael Tonry ed. 2011); Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law 
Care What the Layperson Thinks is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 1839, 1839-40 (2000); William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 
1871-72 (2000). 
 98. HART, supra note 11, at 213. 
 99. ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 10, at 31, 41; JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
OF CRIMINAL LAW 116 (2d ed. 1960).  
 100. MOORE, supra note 12, at 17. 
 101. HUSAK, supra note 13. 
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they support the recklessness mens rea for relational liability, provide 
a workable account of individual actus reus to ground such liability, 
and anticipate a jettisoning of the causation requirement. Finally, 
Hart and Honoré show directly how the causation requirement can de-
fensibly be jettisoned.102 
A.   Mens Rea 
 Between mens rea, actus reus, and causation, mens rea is the ele-
ment that has, for the most part, remained a requirement for criminal 
liability. There is a set of crimes for which liability is strict,103 and neg-
ligence is sometimes used as well,104 which has recently raised calls for 
reform.105 But the use of these mens rea is still relatively rare in  
criminal law.106 
 Intent, knowledge, and recklessness remain.107 Where D acts pur-
suant to one of these mens rea and causes a to occur, liability for a is 
easily grounded. Yet throughout criminal law, and especially as to re-
lational liability, such mens rea and causation often do not exist. 
Where collectivists get around this problem by positing a collective in-
tentionality shared by all members of the collective, this approach 
rests on assigning individual liability based on a mens rea in which 
the individual is assumed, but not proven, to partake. The individual-
ist approach avoids this lack of proof problem by accounting for the 
mens rea held by D that suffices to ground her liability for A’s conduct. 
 H.L.A. Hart advocated for “role-responsibility,” which entails a D 
who acts within a collective and is liable for a task assigned to him by 
agreement or otherwise.108 This is not, strictly speaking, relational li-
ability since the D’s mens rea, actus reus, and causation all reside 
within her. 
                                                                                                                      
 102. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 14, at 17. 
 103. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1960). 
 104. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-105 (2016) (“Any person who causes the death of another 
person by conduct amounting to criminal negligence commits criminally negligent  
homicide . . . .”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 105. S. 2298, 114th Cong. (2015); John Malcolm, The Pressing Need for Mens Rea Re-
form, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 1, 2015) http://www.heritage.org/research/ 
reports/2015/09/the-pressing-need-for-mens-rea-reform [http://perma.cc/U4Z8-8KYN]; John 
Villasenor, Over-Criminalization and Mens Rea Reform: A Primer, THE BROOKINGS INST. 
(Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/12/22-mens-rea-reform-
villasenor [https://perma.cc/XN9Q-KGZQ]. 
 106. Thomas “Tal” DeBauche, Note, Bursting Bottles: Doubting the Objective-Only Ap-
proach to 18 U.S.C. § 875(C) in Light of United States v. Jeffries and the Norms of Online 
Social Networking, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 981, 990 (2014). But see Francis Bowes Sayre, Public 
Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933) (complaining of the use of strict liability for 
certain crimes). 
 107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 108. HART, supra note 11, at 213. 
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 Hart expanded this concept, arguing for liability where a D acted 
with the belief that her conduct could lead to harm.109 Liability could 
attach, then, where a D caused a, but also where D performed an act 
that he knew could result in a.110 Hart implicitly invoked relational 
liability by jettisoning the narrow, scientific causation requirement 
and interpreting the actus reus requirement to include conduct that 
the actor voluntarily performed, where the actor believed the conduct 
would lead to a harmful consequence.111  
 In support of the distinction between conduct “causing” and “result-
ing in” a harmful consequence, Paul Ryu highlighted the malleability 
of each term and the need to refer to some external reference point to 
come to a working definition of “causation.”112 More recently, Eric 
Johnson noted that only sometimes will actions that result in a conse-
quence be deemed causes for purposes of imposing liability.113 For ex-
ample, Sanford Kadish found that one could be liable for the results of 
her conduct if she caused the result or was complicit in the result.114 
 Philosophers known for their work on collective responsibility115 sug-
gest an even broader defense of relational liability than Hart suggested. 
Christopher Kutz, Margaret Gilbert, and Michael Bratman each argue 
for one person’s moral responsibility for the acts of another in certain 
cases, and in similar ways. For them, moral responsibility always re-
mains individual; if an individual contributes nothing to the conduct of 
another in her collective, she cannot be responsible for that conduct 
simply because she is part of the collective.116 They, however, extend 
moral agency of the individual beyond the bounds discussed by Hart, 
                                                                                                                       
 109. Hart proposed that mens rea is satisfied by “intention or something like it,” Id. at 116, 
writing, “[T]he law, though it may also be content with less, is content to hold a man guilty if 
the harmful consequence, e.g. death, was foreseen by the accused in the sense that he believed 
that it would come about as a result of some voluntary action on his part.” Id. at 119. 
 110. Id. at 210 (resting criminal liability on a defendant’s “knowledge or intention” or 
“understanding and control”). 
 111. Id. at 119. 
 112. Paul K. Ryu, Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 773, 777-78 (1958). 
 113. Eric A. Johnson, Criminal Liability for Loss of a Chance, 91 IOWA L. REV. 59, 61 (2005). 
 114. Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of 
Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 327 (1985). 
 115. Also known as “joint commitment,” GILBERT, supra note 59, at 41; “shared agency,” 
MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY: A PLANNING THEORY OF ACTING TOGETHER 4 (2014); 
“social reality,” SEARLE, supra note 5; and “group agency,” LIST & PETTIT, supra note 5. 
 116. As noted supra, some philosophers posit an irreducible collective intentionality 
above and beyond the individual intentionality of the collective’s members. I do not deeply 
consider these theories not because I reject them philosophically, but because they do no 
useful work in individualistic American criminal law. See Robert D. Rupert, Against Group 
Cognitive States, in FROM INDIVIDUAL TO COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY: NEW ESSAYS 97, 97 
(2014) (arguing against collective cognitive states, because “if a group has mental states, 
those states must do causal-explanatory work”). 
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and deeper into the collective, because they embrace the notion that peo-
ple operate simultaneously as individuals and as parts of collectives. 
 Kutz premises individual responsibility on one of three principles. 
On the “Individual Difference Principle,” one is not responsible where 
one has made no difference to an action’s occurrence. 117 On the “Con-
trol Principle,” one is not responsible where one could not have pre-
vented the action.118 And on the “Autonomy Principle,” one is not re-
sponsible for another’s conduct unless one induced or coerced the actor 
into performing the act.119  
 Kutz recognizes, however, that individuals play important roles in 
collective endeavors that these three principles do not reach. He ad-
dresses this “I-We problem” not by abandoning the notion of individual 
moral responsibility, but by expanding the scope of that responsibility 
to allow for an individual’s “participatory intention,” which entails one 
person’s “weak expectations” about another person’s plans plus “suffi-
cient overlap among their participatory intentions.”120 Where an indi-
vidual intentionally contributes to a collective goal and another person 
commits an act toward that goal, the first person may be morally re-
sponsible for the conduct of the second.121 
 Margaret Gilbert argues that each member of a collective is obli-
gated to act “as appropriate” in response to a collective goal.122 This 
implies that each member must form “personal intentions that mesh 
appropriately” with those of other members.123 This makes sense be-
cause most collective plans do not explicitly specify everything that 
must be done to realize them.124 For Gilbert, there are “foundational 
joint commitment[s]” and joint commitments involving “shared sub-
plans,” which are plans that individual collective members carry out 
in order to achieve the foundational plan.125 
 Michael Bratman’s theory of “planning agency” begins with an in-
dividual’s desire to do something, and leads to the individual’s plan-
ning to do that thing, which then leads to “modest sociality,” or a 
shared intention with another to do that thing.126 As with Kutz and 
                                                                                                                      
 117. CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 3 (2000). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 67. 
 121. Id. at 104. 
 122. GILBERT, supra note 59, at 108. 
 123. Id. at 109. 
 124. Id. at 124. 
 125. Id. at 123. 
 126. BRATMAN, supra note 115, at 31. 
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Gilbert, according to Bratman, moral responsibility attaches for an in-
dividual’s own plans and actions, but also for the plans and actions of 
others that comprise “meshing sub-plans.”127 
 These theories envision moral responsibility for the actions of an-
other, but they offer only vaguely legally cognizable limits.128 For ex-
ample, say D and A agree to commit an armed robbery. A illegally buys 
a handgun. D is clearly responsible for this action because it’s neces-
sary to achieving the shared goal of committing armed robbery. But 
should, say, D be responsible for A’s purchase of an illegal automatic 
weapon, which is contributory but not necessary to the shared plan? 
Even more doubtful is that D should be responsible for A’s purchase of 
a legal handgun with an illegal silencer. 
 Kutz’s work highlights the difficulty of establishing meaningful 
limits. While he appears to embrace responsibility where someone 
could reasonably foresee the conduct of a fellow collective member, he 
also rejects Pinkerton liability.129 He resolves that dilemma based on 
epistemic practicality. As an abstract matter, Kutz might support 
Pinkerton liability, but he also recognizes the reality that prosecutors 
advertise many conspiracies as tightly-knit, dangerous groups that 
are, in fact, comprised of attenuated relationships.130 Given this prac-
tical reality, for Kutz “it is very hard to take this claim seriously” that 
Pinkerton is a valid theory of liability.131 
 While Kutz is correct as a practical matter, his abstract theory can 
be finessed to produce a legally cognizable limit to relational liability. 
Kutz limns relational moral responsibility by reference to an individ-
ual’s awareness of another’s conduct by excusing individuals from re-
sponsibility for the acts of others where those acts are “unintended 
consequences” of a collective plan. One person may be responsible for 
                                                                                                                       
 127. Id. at 53. 
 128. The limits that these philosophers place on relational moral responsibility are im-
portant, but are vague in their application. Kutz would require a “tight connection” between 
one person’s participatory intention and another’s act, KUTZ, supra note 117, at 229, mean-
ing that one person is not responsible for another’s action where that action is an “unin-
tended consequence” of the shared agreement. Id. at 155. Thus, responsibility for the act of 
another is not grounded if the act goes “beyond the pale of any reasonable collective expec-
tation.” Id. Gilbert advances an epistemic warning, writing, “[A]ny steps directed against a 
blameworthy collective must be taken with extreme caution, on pain of harming numerous 
individuals who have little or nothing to answer for in connection with that collective’s ac-
tion.” GILBERT, supra note 59, at 80. Bratman adds some relief to this general caution, noting 
that his theory assumes symmetric authority relations, in which each member of a collective 
is truly equal with all other members. BRATMAN, supra note 115, at 85. Kutz echoes this, 
criticizing the fact that uniform sentences imposed on co-conspirators wholly fail to take into 
account relevant differences between individuals’ participatory intentions. KUTZ, supra note 
117, at 229. 
 129. KUTZ, supra note 117, at 215, 221. 
 130. Id. at 221. 
 131. Id. 
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the conduct of another if that conduct can be reasonably expected to 
result from collective intentionality.132 
 This implies that individuals who are reckless in relation to an-
other’s criminal conduct—those who consciously disregard the risk of 
another acting in such a way—should be relationally liable, but those 
who are merely negligent of the possibility of the other’s criminal con-
duct—who unreasonably fail to be aware of the risks—should not be 
liable. This line is reflected in the criminal law’s distaste for imposing 
liability based on a mens rea less than recklessness, and is supported 
by Alexander and Ferzan’s global theory of criminal liability, which 
rests heavily on whether a defendant acted at least recklessly (and, in 
fact, jettisons causation as a sine qua non of liability).133 Jerome Hall, 
furthermore, advocated for assigning liability only for a recklessness 
mens rea or worse.134 Since he wrote that negligence entails “inadvert-
ence”135 and recklessness entails “voluntary harm-doing” or “at least 
an awareness of possible harm,”136 Hall’s conception of recklessness 
reflects Hart’s belief that harm will result basis for liability, Kadish’s 
complicity approach (which seems to imply a certain awareness of 
probable consequences), Alexander’s focus on recklessness,137 and the 
philosophers’ various concepts of joint intention. 
 The question remains whether the requisite recklessness should be 
subjective or objective. If subjective, then relational liability should be 
grounded upon a D’s awareness that her conduct is sufficiently risky, 
or the conduct is chosen.138 If objective, then liability should be 
grounded upon the conclusion that the D ought to know her conduct is 
sufficiently risky and thus has the responsibility to find out about the 
risks of the actions she performs.139 
 As an initial matter, deciding whether to take a subjective or objec-
tive approach to recklessness in the relational liability context seems 
either to not have any substantive impact or to depend upon one’s a 
priori preferences as to the recklessness mens rea as a part of the crim-
inal law’s general part. Consider Pinkerton liability coupled with aid-
ing and abetting: D aids and abets a conspiracy of which A is a mem-
ber. The conspiracy’s aim is to rob a bank. A steals a car, which is used 
                                                                                                                      
 132. Id. at 155. 
 133. ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 10, at 31, 41. 
 134. JEROME HALL, LAW, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND CRIMINAL THEORY 244 (1982). 
 135. Id. at 246. 
 136. Id. at 246-47. 
 137. Larry Alexander, Criminal Liability for Omissions: An Inventory of Issues, in 
CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 121, 125 (Stephen Shute & A.P. 
Simester eds., 2005) (“inadvertent negligence is not culpable”). 
 138. Victor Tadros, Recklessness and the Duty to Take Care, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: 
DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 227-28 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2005). 
 139. Id. 
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in the bank robbery. Under either a subjective or objective approach, 
D will likely be liable for the bank robbery since she was aware of the 
envisioned crime she was aiding. D should be liable for the car theft if 
she recklessly disregarded the likelihood of that crime occurring. But 
whether she should be held to a subjective or objective standard  
depends upon what one thinks of each standard prior to considering  
this particular D. 
 Upon further consideration, relational liability presents a unique 
circumstance whose subjective / objective determination ought to be 
sui generis. Depending as it does on D and A’s joint membership in a 
purposive collective, it could be said that D, by joining the collective, 
assumes a duty to find out about the risks that the collective’s mem-
bers pose. D should perhaps, therefore, be subject to an objective eval-
uation of her potential recklessness. 
 This conclusion is arrived at not by the usual analysis of reckless-
ness as part of criminal law’s general principles. Rather, it emerges as 
an aspect of the special subset of criminal law that is relational liabil-
ity. One might defensibly conclude, therefore, that subjective reckless-
ness is appropriate in the general principles of criminal law, but that 
the special subset of relational liability entails a carve out that calls 
for an objective analysis. This exception is based on the D’s supposed 
duty to know of the risks of her purposive collective that she assumes 
when joining it. Failure to know of the risks of the collective amounts to 
recklessness; the same failure operates as a positive actus reus to defeat 
any potential conflict between omissions law and relational liability.140 
B.   Actus Reus 
 To provide an individualist account of relational liability, the actus 
reus requirement should either be abandoned or reconceived. While 
abandonment is an option,141 the more conservative approach is to re-
conceive it. Michael Moore’s and Douglas Husak’s actus reus theories 
help to do so. 
 Start with direct acting, in which a D performs a that, if done with 
the requisite intent, comprises a crime. This narrow conception does 
not, of course, address relational liability. Moore, however, finds the 
requisite actus reus in D acting to cause a particular state of affairs 
that gives rise to a as committed by another.142 
 This conception of actus reus is connected to the question of causa-
tion. Moore notes that the act requirement depends upon its status as 
both absolute cause-in-fact and proximate cause, the latter of which 
                                                                                                                       
 140. Infra Section III.e. 
 141. HART, supra note 11, at 90, 99 (expressing doubt that the criminal law, contrary to 
the accepted view, in fact contains any real actus reus requirement). 
 142. MOORE, supra note 12, at 17. 
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entails a policy-based evaluation of desert.143 It is only when a cause-
in-fact is established that the question of proximate causation is en-
gaged. Where there is no cause-in-fact, there can be no liability, 
whether or not policy interests support it.144 
 This approach, valid for most aspects of the criminal law, cannot 
apply to relational liability because the willful action of another will 
normally be viewed as an intervening cause, eliminating the D as a 
causer-in-fact. Nevertheless, Moore’s theory of proximate causation 
does provide a relevant insight that can ground liability where there 
is proximate causation but no causation-in-fact. 
 Moore presents three different versions of proximate causation. The 
“ad hoc policy” test is premised on balancing certain “social inter-
ests.”145 The “foreseeability test” asks whether conduct is foreseeable 
to a defendant.146 And the “ ‘harm-within-the-risk’ test” would lead to 
liability where a defendant’s conduct generates a particular matrix of 
risk, which in turn produces harm.147 Each of these versions of proxi-
mate causation reflect the matrix of moral responsibility set forth by 
Kutz, Gilbert, and Bratman; where the philosophers extended an indi-
vidual’s mens rea to embrace responsibility for the acts of another, 
Moore extends an individual’s actus reus to embrace situations in 
which the individual contributes to the acts of another. 
 While the philosophers, discussing mens rea, above, end up implic-
itly adopting a recklessness requirement, Moore does as well,148 
though he arrives at this requirement through his discussion of actus 
reus. To understand how, start with Moore’s discussion of the five dif-
ferent types of accomplice. 
 First, “truly causal accomplices” (or “causal contributors”149) 
should be liable for the actions of others because they use these 
others as tools to effect the conduct at issue.150 These are accom-
plices who control everything,151 and so can be said to have actually 
caused the resulting conduct.152 
                                                                                                                      
 143. Id. at 83. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. at 96. 
 146. Id. at 98. 
 147. Id. at 99. 
 148. Id. at 157 (quoting Justice Cardozo’s admonition that “[n]egligence in the air, so to 
speak, will not do”). 
 149. Id. at 319. 
 150. Id. at 299. 
 151. Id. at 301 (these accomplices “pick[] the victim of the murder, order[] a subordinate 
to do it, pay[] him well for it, locate[] the victim for the hit-man, bring[] the gun and ammu-
nition, and drive[] the hit man [sic] to the location of the killing”). 
 152. Id. at 302. 
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 Second, “necessary accomplices” (or “necessary contributors”153) are 
those who did not cause the result, but without whom the result would 
not have occurred.154 Here, the accomplice should be liable because the 
result “counterfactually depended” upon the accomplice’s action.155 
 Third, “chance-raising” accomplices (or “objective riskers”156) are 
those who by their actions do not cause the result but increase the risk 
of a result to an unreasonable level.157 These accomplices can be liable 
because “to unreasonably risk is to be blameworthy, [with] the degree 
of blame here . . . depending on the culpability with which the risking 
is done.”158 
 Fourth, “[s]ubjectively culpable accomplices” (or “culpable try-
ers”159) are those who seek to assist another in committing a crime.160 
These accomplices are liable where their actions amount to strong cor-
roboration of their intent to commit a crime.161 
 Fifth, “vicarious accomplices” are those who in no way acted, but 
are blamed and held liable simply because they are associated with 
someone who did act.162 Liability is in these cases undeserved. Moore 
locates Pinkerton liability here.163 
 Moore’s plea, in the end, is to uncouple the accomplice and principal 
by eliminating the notion of accomplice liability, meaning that a de-
fendant who does not commit the crime in question and the other per-
son who does are treated as individuals.164 Each person would be 
judged based on her own conduct; accomplices would no longer be 
judged on the legal fiction that they committed the principals’ con-
duct.165 Recall that this implicates Yaffe’s concern with claiming that 
D actually committed a crime, when in fact D merely contributed to 
A’s commission of the crime. Yaffe’s solution is a collectivist one, but 
Moore shows how an individualist approach is feasible. 
                                                                                                                       
 153. Id. at 319. 
 154. Id. at 302-05 (For example, a defendant sees his enemy drowning and a lifeguard 
preparing a rescue. The defendant quickly restrains the lifeguard, and the enemy drowns.). 
 155. Id. at 305. 
 156. Id. at 319. 
 157. Id. at 310. 
 158. Id. at 310. 
 159. Id. at 319. 
 160. Id. at 315. To be sure, these accomplices “do not causally contribute to some legally 
prohibited result, nor are their acts or omissions necessary to that result occurring. Further, 
their acts do not elevate the likelihood of the harm occurring.” Id. at 314. 
 161. Id. at 315-16. 
 162. Id. at 318-19. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 322. 
 165. Id. at 320. 
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 Douglas Husak, in turn, provides an alternative “control” principle 
to that of actus reus.166 Under Husak’s theory, a D might be liable for 
something over which he had control (but didn’t necessarily act to pro-
duce or cause to occur). Thus, omissions may in some cases stand in 
for an actus reus.167 Put another, broader way, the actus reus “require-
ment is designed to ensure that persons are liable only when they are 
responsible.”168 This means, at the very least, that a D may be liable 
for something when he “performs a voluntary act, intending, knowing, 
or consciously disregarding the risk that it will cause him to perform 
a subsequent nonvoluntary criminal act.”169 
 It can also reasonably mean that a D’s voluntary entry into a pur-
posive collective that has a criminal aim can result in D’s liability for 
certain criminal results of that collective, even if D didn’t voluntarily 
act to bring them about, but if D recklessly acted such that they oc-
curred through the actions of A.170 
 The use of Moore’s theory to evaluate the structure of relational li-
ability suggests that individuals who act in collectives would be liable, 
if at all, based only on their own conduct, but could be liable for this 
conduct if it is reckless vis-à-vis the conduct of others. Truly vicarious 
accomplices would not be liable, because they don’t act in any way in 
relation to the criminal conduct of another. Truly causal accomplices 
would be liable because they act with the pure intent to generate the 
criminal result. 
 Those accomplices in the middle of these two extremes should be 
judged by a recklessness standard. We know this for a number of rea-
sons. First, Moore rejects negligence-based Pinkerton liability. Second, 
he would premise liability on a defendant’s active conduct vis-à-vis an-
other’s criminal activity (and not a defendant’s negligent ignorance of 
her contributions to another’s criminal activity). Third, he would 
premise liability on a defendant’s conduct that is strongly corrobora-
tive of an attempt to assist another in committing a crime. Reckless-
ness implies a defendant’s active participation (if only by consciously 
ignoring his role in risk-production) in another’s criminal conduct. 
Conduct that reflects this active participation can be said to be reck-
less, and thus satisfies the actus reus requirement. 
                                                                                                                      
 166. HUSAK, supra note 13. 
 167. Id. at 84. 
 168. Douglas Husak, Rethinking the Act Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2437, 2454 
(2007). 
 169. Id. at 2457. 
 170. To be sure, this does contradict Husak’s opinion that, under the control principle, 
even negligent acts and omissions may ground liability. See HUSAK, supra note 13, at 136. 
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C.   Jettisoning Causation 
 Causation at base entails an individual D performing a criminal a 
or performing another action that is the intended cause-in-fact of a and 
results in a. While the doctrine qui facit per alium facit per se oper-
ates171 to produce some relational liability, it is limited to situations in 
which an A is D’s mere instrument, much as a servant is said to be the 
legal instrument of a master.172 It therefore does not ground many 
forms of relational liability, including, for example, a co-conspirator’s 
liability for the conduct of her fellow, who commits the crime envi-
sioned by the conspiracy. 
 As with actus reus, causation can be modified to suit individualist 
relational liability by expanding or jettisoning it.173 Unlike actus reus, 
the causation requirement can be effectively dispensed with, which a 
number of scholars have suggested.174 This means that relational lia-
bility is comprised not of what A.P. Simester and Stephen Shute would 
call “result crimes,” but of normatively grounded “conduct crimes.”175 
 H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré advanced Mill’s notion of causation, 
in which the law does not discern the cause of an occurrence (because 
there is never a single cause) but normatively selects a contributing 
causal factor from an array of contributing factors to label as cause.176 
We typically look for a Sole Causal Event, but should embrace the “doc-
trine of the plurality of causes.”177 This means that a causation deter-
mination is a normative endeavor178 and that causation of harm is nei-
ther always necessary nor sufficient to ground liability.179 
                                                                                                                       
 171. Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. 
REV. 689, 690 (1930) [hereinafter, Responsibility]; see also Michael B. North, Qui Facit Per 
Alium, Facit Per Se: Representation, Mandate, and Principles of Agency in Louisiana at the 
Turn of the Twenty-First Century, 72 TUL. L. REV. 279, 287 n.50 (1997) (Latin translated as 
“[w]hoever acts through another acts as if he were doing it himself.”). 
 172. Sayre, supra note 171, at 693. 
 173. Like Moore’s work, Husak’s control principle can stand in for actus reus and causa-
tion alike. See HUSAK, supra note 13, at 170 (“I suggest that the control principle is a pref-
erable alternative to the causal requirement of orthodox criminal theory.”). 
 174. Michael Moore, as discussed above, would likely premise liability on a D recklessly 
causing a particular state of affairs that itself generates the probability of harm. Francis Sayre 
suggested that a “natural and probable consequence” test for liability could stand in for causa-
tion. Sayre would premise liability not on strict causation, but on these consequences, or on 
“knowledge plus acquiescence.” Sayre, Responsibility, supra note 171, at 699, 702. 
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LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 1, 2 n.5 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester 
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its consequences.”). 
 176. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 14, at 17. 
 177. Id. at 19. 
 178. Id. at 65-66 (causation determination “is a disguised way of asserting the ‘norma-
tive’ judgment that [someone] is responsible”). 
 179. Id. at 67. 
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 If strict causation as a requirement is jettisoned, as it should be, 
liability might be imposed for what could be called a contributory al-
ternative, in which a D is liable for contributing to a criminal outcome 
(assuming the requisite mens rea and actus reus) as one of a set of 
factors. But this approach would save some culpable people from lia-
bility. Consider three people who agree to steal people’s identities and 
open credit card accounts in their names. They all agree that D1 and 
D2 would obtain identifications from data service providers, and A 
would actually open the credit card accounts. D1 and D2 do so, but A 
ultimately uses only the information that D2 provides. Under the con-
tributory alternative, D1 might escape liability. 
 The law could instead impose liability based on an attempted con-
tributory alternative, in which a D is liable for attempting to contrib-
ute, whether or not she actually contributes. This is, in fact, inherent 
in the test for relational liability I propose below. It also entirely jetti-
sons the causation requirement. Assuming that D acted with at least 
recklessness, it should not matter whether D caused or even contrib-
uted to A’s action.180 
 This is so even when jettisoning causation is evaluated against ex-
pansive definitions of causation. Jerome Hall, for example, offered that 
one definition of “cause” was “giving a person a motive to act—to cause 
[him] to act means to persuade or coerce him to act or to proceed in 
other ways which foreseeably give him a ground or incentive for ac-
tion.”181 He went on to note that intervening causes that still ground 
liability for the non-acting D include situations in which the D’s “con-
duct motivates other persons (sometimes the victim) to act, and their 
conduct is the immediate cause of a death.”182 To ground liability, 
“[t]his type of causation is limited to interpersonal relations and . . . 
must be sharply distinguished from causation in the biological and  
inanimate realms.”183 
 Hall’s definition of causation departs far from most individuals’ con-
ception of causation and is foreign to a conservative reading of that 
requirement. It seems more efficient to jettison the requirement. Hall 
does, however, point directly to relational criminal liability by apply-
ing his definition of causation only to “interpersonal relations.”184 
                                                                                                                      
 180. Hart and Honoré would likely support this approach, because they look to the rea-
sons someone acts instead of causation. Id. at 51. I acknowledge that Hart and Honoré’s 
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D.   A Test for Liability 
 Built upon the legal theory and moral philosophy discussed above 
is a practicable normative test for evaluating theories of relational li-
ability that looks to a D’s own mens rea and actus reus, requires a 
mens rea of at least recklessness, and jettisons the need to prove cau-
sation. This proposal is a conservative one because it remains closely 
tethered to traditional criminal law norms, but it also is crafted to re-
spond appropriately to the structure of relational liability. It can be 
stated as follows: 
Liability for the acts of another: 
I.   A defendant may be liable for the criminal act of another if 
a. The defendant acts or refrains from acting with the intent 
to facilitate the criminal action of another; 
b. The defendant acts or refrains from acting with the 
knowledge that his acting or refraining from acting is more 
likely than not to facilitate the criminal action of another; 
or 
c. The defendant acts or refrains from acting with conscious dis-
regard for the substantial likelihood that his acting or refrain-
ing from acting will facilitate the criminal action of another.185 
 This proposal is based upon four criteria. 
 First, D and A’s joint membership in a purposive collective does not 
depend upon mutual agreement to facilitate or even mutual knowledge 
of the other’s existence. This is the Tally problem presented in State 
                                                                                                                       
 185. This test does not consider liability of D for the actions of A when D and A do not 
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are closed [sic]. You can’t just come to Afghanistan now to get training and go 
home. Now the battle is in your own backyard. The battle is what you yourself 
are able to do with your own abilities, so you should do whatever you can. It is 
an individual duty upon you to participate in the struggle. It is not about Usama 
Bin Laden and it’s not about al Qaeda. It is about the methodology and the ide-
ology behind them. If you follow the same methodology and the same ideology, 
then you too can be al Qaeda. 
United States v. Kassir, No. 04 Cr. 356(JFK), 2009 WL 2913651, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2009). 
Such crimes are not part of the structure of relational criminal liability, and are thus not 
treated in this Article. These crimes could, however, be considered on their own, as part of 
what could be called the structure of ‘a relational criminal liability.’ 
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ex rel. Martin v. Tally,186 in which the defendant was convicted of aid-
ing and abetting a murder where the murderers were not aware of the 
aiding and abetting.187 Subsequent courts have affirmed the possibility 
of D’s liability for aiding and abetting A in such cases.188 
 Tally liability, however, is still relational liability because purposive 
collectives entail shared, overlapping intentions that members collec-
tively work toward, but not necessarily awareness of these intentions.189 
Consider a D and A who decide to commit armed robbery of a bank. D 
inserts a virus into the bank’s computerized security system, and A pur-
chases illegal weapons, both of which are illegal acts. Both will clearly 
be liable for each other’s criminal act. Unbeknownst to A, D also places 
a set of car lock picks into A’s backpack, thinking that it will help A steal 
a car. A discovers the lock picks, believing that she left them there from 
a previous heist. She uses the picks to steal a getaway car. D had a 
Kutzian weak expectation that A would steal the car, and D and A im-
plicitly shared a Bratmanian meshing sub-plan to steal the car. D’s fa-
cilitation did not depend on A being aware of the facilitation. 
 Second, liability based on negligently acting or failing to act is im-
permissible. Although the Model Penal Code embraces such liability, 
negligence is in fact rarely used to ground criminal liability190 and gen-
erally must be explicitly stated by statute.191 Drawing the line at reck-
lessness tracks the work of the criminal law scholars and philosophers 
of collective responsibility, who tend to justify liability (or moral re-
sponsibility) on a D consciously acting or recklessly failing to act in a 
way that facilitates another’s criminal conduct, rather than a D failing 
to realize the harmful potentiality of her conduct. 
 This means that a D ought not be liable where the D merely knows 
of and acquiesces to A’s performance of a. This is so because knowledge 
                                                                                                                      
 186. 15 So. 722 (1894). 
 187. Id. at 724. 
 188. Chisler v. State, 553 So. 2d 654, 665 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (allowing for “accomplice 
liability in the absence of a conspiracy or an agreement between the parties”); Seward v. State, 
118 A.2d 505, 507 (Md. 1955); State v. Nutley, 129 N.W.2d 155, 167 (Wis. 1964). But see United 
States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 448-49 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[Aiding and abetting] has two prongs—
association and participation. To prove association, there must be evidence to establish that 
the defendant shared in the criminal intent of the principal.” (citations omitted)). 
 189. Kutz’s “weak expectations” about another person’s plans plus “sufficient overlap 
among their participatory intentions,” Gilbert’s view that each member of a collective is ob-
ligated to act “as appropriate” in response to a collective goal, and Bratman’s “meshing sub-
plans” all suggest, but do not appear to require a conscious meeting of the minds regarding 
shared intent—they only require the shared, overlapping intent itself. See sources cited su-
pra notes 120, 122, and 126. 
 190. DeBauche, supra note 106, at 990. 
 191. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 116-17 (“If the relevant statute is silent, the minimally 
required form of culpability is recklessness . . . . [I]n the common law tradition, negligence is 
a suspect basis of liability.”). 
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alone of another’s potential (or likely) conduct entails no mens rea vis-
à-vis that conduct. Where, however, there is knowledge plus the req-
uisite mens rea to facilitate, then liability is justified.192 
 Third, causation as a concept must be jettisoned. Relational liabil-
ity nearly always entails an A acting as an intervening cause between 
D’s action and a. A causation requirement would render virtually all 
relational liability unjustifiable.  
 Some might think that jettisoning causation could result in liability 
for one’s mere intent alone. This is not so, since the actus reus require-
ment remains.193 Furthermore, causation in criminal law is arguably 
an oversold concept. The very meaning of causation has for a long time 
been the subject of controversy194 and has, in criminal law, remained 
underdeveloped.195 Causation has, indeed, always been as much a nor-
mative inquiry as a scientific one.196 This normativity allows scholars 
to finesse their notions of causation to suit their theories of punish-
ment.197 It also permits the position that causation is entirely unnec-
essary to determine liability and ground culpability. This position is 
based on the notion that it makes little sense to require actual harm 
to ground criminal liability; a person’s bad intent coupled with requi-
site conduct connected to that intent (whatever harm it causes or does 
not cause) should be enough.198 Causation can normatively be jetti-
soned, and it must be jettisoned if relational liability is to function.199 
                                                                                                                       
 192. For example, my mere knowledge of a genocide on another continent does not make 
me liable for a warlord’s murder of a civilian—even if I might have sponsored the civilian’s 
visa to the United States. However, if I am a friend of the warlord, he has asked me not to 
sponsor a visa, and I respond favorably to his request, I may be liable because I am now in a 
purposive collective with the warlord and may be said to facilitate his murderous action 
(whether intentionally or recklessly). 
 193. To be sure, evidence of one’s “agreement” with another, as in conspiracy law, can be 
fleeting and unclear, which justifiably draws the ire of critics, including me. Morrison, Con-
spiracy Law’s Threat, supra note 37. This evidentiary problem, however, is external to the 
structure of relational liability, and is thus not the focus of this Article. 
 194. Ryu, supra note 112, at 775. 
 195. Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78, 82 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he doctrine of causation is 
more developed [in tort law] than in criminal law.”). 
 196. Arthur Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 
547, 564-65 (1988). 
 197. Lawrence Crocker, A Retributive Theory of Criminal Causation, 5 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 65, 66 (1994). 
 198. Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 30 
(1994); Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 686 (1994); Stephen J. Morse, The Moral Metaphysics of 
Causation and Results, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 879, 881 (2000). But see Jerome Hall, Science 
and Reform in Criminal Law, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 787, 800 (1952) (“Causation, another 
principle of criminal law, is meaningful in explanation of the relation between conduct 
and harm. If harm is excluded, causation becomes meaningless.”). 
 199. To be sure, a causation requirement may serve as a proxy indicator for mens rea, 
protecting defendants against charges that are readily, but unreliably, provable. See Allen 
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 Fourth, relational liability must be found in a D’s own conduct and 
intent. This conservative approach maintains the law’s focus on indi-
vidual culpability and permits the imposition of normatively appropri-
ate relational liability.  
E.   As to Omissions Law 
 The test for relational liability may be viewed as rejecting omissions 
law, pursuant to which an individual has no obligation to act to pre-
vent the crime of another, even if the failure to act will serve the crim-
inal endeavors of the other.200 The test for relational liability, in fact, 
does not reject this, because both the test and omissions law imply no 
liability where D and A are not in the same purposive collective. Where 
D and A are in the same purposive collective, both the test and omis-
sions law permit largely overlapping liability. 
 Omissions come in different forms—some are liability-grounding, 
some are not.201 While it can be difficult to discern which omissions are 
actionable and which are not,202 the typical approach is to ground lia-
bility for omissions where there is a legally imposed duty to act.203 The 
difficulty of discerning which omissions generate liability and which 
do not often entails a normative question as to which legal duties to 
act are appropriate to impose on individuals.204 
                                                                                                                      
R. Friedman, Aiding and Abetting the Investment of Dirty Money: Mens Rea and the Non-
racketeer Under RICO Section 1962(a), 82 COLUM. L. REV. 574, 574 (1982) (The “central 
problem” of allowing nonracketeers to be convicted under RICO is “whether such persons, 
whose actions in aid of investments may be blameless except for the origin of the money 
being invested, act with the requisite mens rea to criminalize their conduct.”); George C. 
Thomas III, A Blameworthy Act Approach to the Double Jeopardy Same Offense Problem, 
83 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1047 (1995) (Continuing Criminal Enterprise “is defined without 
mens rea. . . . The predicate[] [acts] thus function . . . as a stand-in for mens rea.”); Note, 
Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 935-36 (1959) (it 
would be difficult “to conceive of any crime in which the intent is less specific” than conspir-
acy). This is, however, an evidentiary problem and is thus external to the system of relational 
liability that this Article evaluates. Moreover, if relational liability did entail a causation 
requirement, it is difficult to see how prosecutors would be prevented from prosecuting vir-
tually all defendants who might be relationally liable. 
 200. Francis Barry McCarthy, Crimes of Omission in Pennsylvania, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 
633, 633 (1995). 
 201. Jacobo Dopico Gómez-Aller, Criminal Omissions: A European Perspective, 11 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 419, 420-21 (2008) (noting the difference between “commission by omission” 
and “pure omission”); Jesús-María Silva Sánchez, Criminal Omissions: Some Relevant Dis-
tinctions, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 452, 452 (2008) (noting the difference between “simple omis-
sions” and “inauthentic omissions,” or “commission by omission”). 
 202. Leavens, supra note 196, at 548-49. 
 203. State ex rel. Kuntz v. Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Ct., 995 P.2d 951, 955 (Mont. 
2000); Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 617 A.2d 1339, 1344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); State v. Wil-
liquette, 385 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Wis. 1986); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 204. Leavens, supra note 196, at 548-49. 
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 The test for relational liability does impose liability for a D’s reckless 
failure to act in the context of a purposive collective. Put another way, 
the test sometimes imposes on D a duty to act to prevent or mitigate A’s 
criminal conduct. By virtue of the D and A’s purposive criminal collec-
tive, this duty seems to me to be generally normatively appropriate.205 
 Imposing a duty to act suggests that a D’s omission can be consid-
ered a normatively inappropriate act that contributes to A’s a, and 
thus grounds liability.206 Where there is a purposive criminal collec-
tive, such a duty is appropriate in certain circumstances. For example, 
if a D is charged with conspiracy to commit armed robbery and A steals 
a getaway car, proof of the conspiracy implies D’s dual and related du-
ties: to act so as to prevent or mitigate any criminal conduct that is a 
reasonably foreseeable aspect of the conspiracy, and to not act for the 
same purpose. If D, then, fails to act such that the failure may facilitate 
the criminal conduct, and D does so at least recklessly, it seems norma-
tively appropriate to impose liability on D for that conduct. Proof of the 
purposive criminal collective entails the legal duty to act such that an 
omission may be viewed as a liability-grounding commission.207 
F.   As to the Defense of Abandonment 
 It could be argued that jettisoning causation means that the de-
fense of abandonment (also known as withdrawal208 or renunciation209) 
is essentially nullified.210 While this argument makes initial sense, it 
can ultimately be dismissed. 
 Abandonment is supposed to provide would-be criminals with a lo-
cus poenitentiae,211 or a space for someone who has formed a criminal 
                                                                                                                       
 205. If one who commits a crime owes a “debt” because of her guilt, Fletcher, Collective 
Guilt, supra note 6, at 168, it makes sense to impose a duty on that person to mitigate or 
avoid incurring increasing amounts of debt prior to punishment. Alan Norrie, furthermore, 
would impose liability “for an omission to an individual or individuals on the basis not of 
what was done, but in terms of an additional relationship giving rise to the need for an act.” 
NORRIE, supra note 1, at 152. 
 206. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 45 (“[T]he lack of human agency is not the problem ex-
pressed in the widespread anxiety about punishing omissions. There is agency and in this 
sense action in choosing nothing or choosing to do something.”); HALL, PRINCIPLES, supra 
note 181, at 247 (“[W]hile, in a physical sense, an omission cannot of itself produce any ex-
ternal harm, nevertheless in law, as in everyday ethics, under certain conditions, personal 
forbearance is regarded as making use of external objects and forces.”). 
 207. The purposive collective would thus entail a special relationship that gives rise to 
legal duties. See HUSAK, supra note 13, at 166 (“No one doubts that liability is just in cases 
involving ‘special relationships,’ for instance, when a parent deliberately and maliciously 
starves his infant to death.”). 
 208. See Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714, 718 (2013). 
 209. See Thomas v. State, 708 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. Crim. App.1986). 
 210. See Carroll v. State, 680 So. 2d 1065, 1066 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). 
 211. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty Dep-
rivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. REV. 141, 165 (2011); DAD Notes, 
1987 ARMY LAW. 47, 48 n.21. 
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mens rea to reconsider, back out of completing a crime, and thereby 
avoid liability.212 The argument therefore makes initial sense because 
the test for relational liability seems to expose Ds to liability much 
earlier in their criminal endeavor than current law provides. Further-
more, the requisite actus reus under the test for relational liability can 
be quite preliminary and practically unimpactful. As such, there may 
be a very small locus poenitentiae for a D to form a criminal mens rea 
and then, say, withdraw from a conspiracy or abandon an attempt to 
aid and abet another.213 Thus, while the test for relational liability does 
not formally reject abandonment, it may practically eliminate the op-
portunity for it to operate as intended. 
 This concern, however, rests on a misunderstanding of the test for 
relational liability as defining conduct that amounts to criminal liabil-
ity, as if the test itself were a criminal law. The test in fact applies to 
extant crimes of relational liability. It does not redefine the elements of 
any crime. Rather, it makes a normative argument that some forms of 
relational liability are defensible, and others are not. With no elemental 
redefinition, the space for locus poenitentiae remains unaltered. 
 Furthermore, just as the test for relational liability does not rede-
fine elements of crimes, it also does not abrogate statutes providing for 
abandonment. Laws like those in Minnesota,214 Pennsylvania,215 and 
others216 provide detailed prescriptions governing the defense. These 
laws protect defendants more than the test for relational liability 
would and, in any event, these statutes are legally in force, whereas 
the test for relational liability merely defines the furthest normatively 
                                                                                                                      
 212. Robert Batey, Minority Report and the Law of Attempt, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 689, 
694 (2004). 
 213. Ronald J. Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified 
Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321, 343 n.83 (1980) (“To 
say that a locus poenitentiae should be provided is to say that a defendant should have a 
chance to change his mind if he is going to. Thus, the purpose of a locus poenitentiae is to 
provide yet another means to ensure to the extent feasible that the defendant is in fact em-
barked on a path of criminality from which he most likely will not stray.”). 
 214. MINN. STAT. § 609.05, Subdiv. 3 (2017) (“A person who intentionally aids, advises, 
hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures another to commit a crime and there-
after abandons that purpose and makes a reasonable effort to prevent the commission of the 
crime prior to its commission is not liable if the crime is thereafter committed.”). 
 215. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 903(f) (2017) (“Renunciation.—It is a defense that the actor, 
after conspiring to commit a crime, thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under circum-
stances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal intent.”). 
 216. HAW. REV. STAT. § 705-525 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:5-2(2)(f) (West 2016). 
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defensible extent of criminal liability in the relational context. Aban-
donment and the test for relational liability are therefore of different 
natures and are not mutually exclusive.217  
IV.   TESTING THE STRUCTURE OF RELATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 The structure of relational liability is comprised of many substan-
tive crimes and theories of liability,218 all of which are determined by 
four variables. First, this liability may be based in D’s assistance or 
anticipation of A’s a. Second, D may be charged or uncharged with the 
substantive crime in question. Third, the crime may be realized or un-
realized. Fourth, D’s liability may be based on a simple theory or mul-
tiple theories compounded together.219 Six categories of relational lia-
bility prevail in the case law. 
A.   Actor-Causer 
 “Actor-causer” liability inheres where D acts, and thereby causes a. 
Actor-causer liability therefore includes direct, non-relational liability,220 
but it also includes two other, more relational crimes: “kingpin” liability 
under CCE and D’s liability for conspiracy where D was a conspirator. 
 A CCE kingpin conviction requires proof that a D (1) supervised or 
organized five or more people, (2) committed a narcotics felony that 
was part of a series of such felonies, and (3) thereby obtained substan-
tial income or resources.221 While kingpin liability resides in a rela-
tional context because it is based on a purposive collective including D 
and others, the liability itself is not relational because it depends only 
on what the D intended, did, and caused. In other words, kingpin lia-
bility requires proof of a relationship with others, but the core ele-
ments of the crime look only to the individual D’s mens rea, actus reus, 
and causation. 
                                                                                                                       
 217. While I implicitly argue that legislatures should apply the test for relational liabil-
ity by repealing some relational liability crimes, I am not arguing—at least in this article—
that the test is one of constitutional magnitude that should compel legislatures or courts to act. 
 218. Aiding and abetting offers a good illustration of the difference between “crime” and 
“theory of liability.” D may be charged with the substantive crime of aiding and abetting 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1951). D may also be charged with the crime of murder, which an A 
committed, where the theory of liability is that D aided and abetted A in the murder. 
 219. I do not include felony murder in this list, because, while it ought to be subject to 
the test for relational criminal liability, where appropriate, it is a highly complex system of 
law itself, not least because it can be committed by one person alone, or vicariously through 
another. See Guyora Binder, Felony Murder in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME AND LAW 
18, 22 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2012). 
 220. As, for example, when D is charged with armed robbery because D entered a con-
venience store, held a gun to the clerk, and demanded and absconded with money. 
 221. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2006). 
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 Along with most crimes that entail D’s mens rea, actus reus, and 
causation, CCE “kingpin” liability is similarly justified. While CCE en-
tails collective action, kingpin liability is premised upon D’s own in-
tentional commission of a narcotics felony.222 The collective is relevant 
only to provide an aggravating character to the defendant’s conduct. 
 In addition to CCE liability, D may be liable for a conspiracy she 
engages in with A to commit a, as well as a itself where D committed 
a.223 Despite critiques of conspiracy liability, which are aimed mostly 
at externalities,224 these conspiracy charges are justified because proof 
of conspiracy liability is based solely on a D’s mens rea (intent to con-
spire), actus reus (agreement with another to conspire), and causation 
(because D’s intentional act in agreeing is a sine qua non, or but-for 
cause, of the conspiracy).225 The only relational aspect is that a co-con-
spirator must also agree to the conspiracy. And, in fact, the require-
ment that two people agree is not universal. In New York, for example, 
a single person may “conspire” with an undercover government agent 
who, of course, has no intention to commit any crime.226 
B.   Charged Assistor—Realized 
 “Charged assistor—realized” liability attaches when D is charged 
with assisting another in committing a crime that the other in fact 
committed. This liability includes four crimes. First, D may be charged 
with aiding and abetting A in A’s plan to commit a.227 Second, D may 
be charged with a as a co-conspirator, where the goal of the conspiracy 
                                                                                                                      
 222. Id. 
 223. For example, one can be convicted of conspiracy to import marijuana as well as im-
portation of marijuana. United States v. Cannington, 729 F.2d 702, 705, 713 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 224. These critiques mostly look to conspiracy law’s vagueness, its evidentiary problems, 
its political nature, or the strategic purposes to which prosecutors put such charges. Krule-
witch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 447-48 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); David B. Fil-
varoff, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 189 (1972); Abraham S. 
Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959); Paul Marcus, 
Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from an Ever Expanding, Ever More Troubling 
Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1992); Bernard D. Meltzer, Robert H. Jackson: Nurem-
berg’s Architect and Advocate, 68 ALB. L. REV. 55, 57 (2004); Morrison, supra note 37; Eric 
A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and International Law, 55 DUKE L.J. 75, 82 (2005); 
Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1922). 
 225. But see Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 
1137 (1973), for what may be the best critique of substantive conspiracy law. 
 226. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.30 (MCKINNEY 2016). 
 227. As, for example, where A plans to purchase drugs for resale, and D drives A to meet 
a known drug dealer with the intent of helping A to purchase drugs. 
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is a and A commits a.228 Third, D may be charged with being an acces-
sory after the fact to A, who committed a.229 Fourth, D may be charged 
with aiding and abetting a CCE kingpin.230 
 As an initial matter, each of these crimes carries a mens rea of in-
tent and actus reus of facilitation, so can be justified.231 The reality, 
however, may be less clear. 
 Aiding and abetting has been subject to different interpretations. 
For example, the Second Circuit at one time took three divergent posi-
tions on aiding and abetting.232 And it was as late as 2014 that the 
United States Supreme Court defined the requisite actus reus and 
mens rea for proof of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a 
drug crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).233 In Rosemond v. United States, 
the Court considered a D’s conviction for aiding and abetting an A’s 
use or carrying of a firearm during a drug offense.234 The Court held 
that the D’s participation in the drug transaction as the actus reus235 
and knowledge that his confederate would carry a gun as the mens 
rea236 were sufficient to ground aiding and abetting liability. Even with 
this clarification, Justice Alito, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, noted that tension remains in Supreme Court jurisprudence re-
garding the mens rea requirement.237 One thread, Justice Alito noted, 
requires purpose or intent, and another thread requires mere 
knowledge.238 The Rosemond Court left the mens rea of recklessness 
unaddressed, leaving a large unexplored gap between the extreme 
                                                                                                                       
 228. As, for example, where D and A conspire to purchase drugs for resale, and D pro-
vides A with the name of a known drug dealer, and A sets up and makes the purchase from 
the dealer. 
 229. As, for example, where A purchases drugs for resale, and after the sale D hides the 
drugs for A’s protection and convenience. 
 230. As, for example, where D is a major drug dealer and provides drugs to a CCE king-
pin. United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1232 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 231. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 (1951), 3 (1994), 371 (1994). 
 232. One version allowed for liability if the defendant was merely aware that a crime would 
take place; it did not matter whether the defendant facilitated or encouraged it. United States 
v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40, 46 (2d Cir. 1994) (Citing caselaw for the proposition that “a defendant 
aids and abets a violation of § 924(c) by planning a crime of violence with the knowledge that a 
firearm will be used, regardless of whether the defendant committed any act to facilitate or 
encourage the use of a firearm in relation to the underlying crime.” (citations omitted)). Another 
version required the defendant to perform some affirmative act relating to the crime aided and 
abetted. United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 676 (2d Cir. 1996). And a third version entailed 
liability on a theory of constructive possession (where the crime was possession of a firearm). 
United States v. Pimentel, 83 F.3d 55, 58-60 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 233. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1247-48 (2014). 
 234. Id. at 1243. 
 235. Id. at 1247. 
 236. Id. at 1249. 
 237. Id. at 1253 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 238. Id. 
672  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:635 
   
mens reas of intent and knowledge. To the extent that aiding and abet-
ting liability is premised on less than recklessness, it is not justified. 
 Aiders and abettors are also subject to liability as principals, expos-
ing them to the same sentences as the A’s who actually performed a. 
This suggests Yaffe’s concern regarding substantive liability and also 
presents comparative and absolute retributivist justice questions. 
These questions are particularly poignant when the charge is aiding 
and abetting a CCE kingpin, which can lead to an aider and abettor 
being charged as an organization leader,239 where actual members of 
the CCE are treated more leniently.240 
 Co-conspirator liability may entail the same asymmetric authority 
relationship, undermining its retributivist justifiability.241 Asymmet-
ric authority relationships (those characterized by unequal power 
among individuals) do not, however, negate intent—even the most im-
pressionable co-conspirator must be shown to have intended to con-
spire and to commit the crime envisioned by the conspiracy, and to 
have actually conspired.242 
 The existence of asymmetric authority relations should not, fur-
thermore, mean that the law should impose a regime of scaled culpa-
bility, in which all aiders and abettors and co-conspirators are per se 
                                                                                                                      
 239. There is a circuit split as to this question. United States v. Pierson, 53 F.3d 62, 64 
(4th Cir. 1995) (expressing doubt regarding kingpin liability for aiding and abetting); United 
States v. Miskinis, 966 F.2d 1263, 1267-68 (9th Cir. 1992) (embracing liability); United 
States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1231 (7th Cir. 1989) (embracing liability, but highlight-
ing the significant circuit split as to this question). 
 240. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1231-32, 1236. Congress addressed this problem as to ac-
cessory after the fact, which set forth in statute that an accessory can receive a sentence of 
only half the maximum term of imprisonment that the principal receives. 18 U.S.C. § 3 
(1994). But the difference between aiding and abetting and accessory after the fact makes 
sense for two reasons. First, accessories could not have prevented and did not contribute to 
the principal’s crime, whereas aiders and abettors might have prevented and played causal 
roles in the crime. Second, aiders and abettors are not invariably less culpable than principal 
actors. Some aiders and abettors play such a causal role that their culpability is equal to or 
greater than that of principals. See Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1232 (aider and abettor was a 
bigger drug dealer than the person he aided and abetted); Adam Harris Kurland, To “Aid, 
Abet, Counsel, Command, Induce, or Procure the Commission of an Offense”: A Critique of 
Federal Aiding and Abetting Principles, 57 S.C. L. REV. 85, 86 (2005). In contrast, it seems 
unlikely that an accessory could contribute equally to the principal’s crime, already commit-
ted, or would have any incentive to take advantage of a principal. 
 241. Michael Bratman, one of the philosophers relied upon in Part III, explicitly supports 
co-conspirator liability, but only where all co-conspirators are equal participants. BRATMAN, 
supra note 115, at 63, 85 (putting aside conditions involving “asymmetric authority relations”). 
 242. United States v. Araujo, 310 F. App’x 21, 22-24 (7th Cir. 2009) (A drug conspiracy 
defendant argued that his father was the supervisor of the conspiracy, and that the defend-
ant was “an impressionable young man—in his early twenties at the time—unduly influ-
enced by his father to enter the conspiracy.” The district court nevertheless found that the 
defendant was an “integral” part of the conspiracy and gave no downward sentencing depar-
ture. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.). 
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less culpable than their fellows who actually commit a. While commit-
ting an act may entail greater moral culpability than merely assisting 
the act,243 it is also true that some aiders and abettors and co-conspira-
tors are more culpable than those who actually commit a.244 Regimes 
of scaled culpability would prevent judges from taking this into ac-
count. Retributivist justice, in the end, is not served either by mandat-
ing equal liability or scaled liability, but rather by judicial discretion 
in sentencing.245 And that, if anything, is a problem external to the 
structure of relational liability.246 
C.   Uncharged Assistor—Realized 
 “Uncharged assistor—realized” liability refers to a D who assists an 
A in committing a crime that A in fact commits, but where D is not 
formally charged with assisting it. This classification includes liability 
where D is said to be liable for A’s doing a under a theory of aiding and 
abetting or conspiracy, but where D was not formally charged with 
aiding and abetting or conspiracy.247 For example, in one case a de-
fendant was charged with and convicted of drunk driving.248 However, 
she neither actually drove drunk nor was charged with aiding and 
abetting another in driving drunk.249 Instead, the implicit theory of 
aiding and abetting enabled her conviction.250  
 Using aiding and abetting and conspiracy as theories of liability, 
rather than as formal charges whose proof will ground liability, makes 
no difference in terms of internal justifiability. All other things being 
                                                                                                                       
 243. Joshua Dressler, Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Of-
fense?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 427, 433 (2008). 
 244. Kurland, supra note 240, at 86. 
 245. To be sure, discretion is far from sufficient to ensure justice, since although it allows 
for individualized sentences, it also entails dynamic and normatively unacceptable dispari-
ties, Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 539 (2002), 
has been blamed for the failure of at least one juvenile justice system, Carrie T. Hollister, 
The Impossible Predicament of Gina Grant, 44 UCLA L. REV. 913, 924 (1997), and has been 
referred to as lawless, MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 
(Hill and Wang New York 1972). 
 246. Discussed infra, Part V. 
 247. In United States v. Thirion, the defendant was charged with multiple fraud counts 
and conspiracy, and was extradited from Monaco. United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 
149-50 (8th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to the extradition agreement, the defendant could not be 
tried for conspiracy. Id. at 151. The district court did not dismiss the conspiracy count, but 
instructed the jury that it could not return a verdict on that count. Id. Nevertheless, the 
court noted that conspiracy and aiding and abetting, even where not charged, can be bases 
for substantive liability. Id. at 151-52. 
 248. State v. Byrd, 1986 WL 8850, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 1986). 
 249. Id. at *1. 
 250. Id. at *2; accord Williams v. State, 352 S.W.2d 230 (Tenn. 1961). 
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equal, the mechanism for determining liability doesn’t matter.251 All 
that matters is that the D acted with the requisite recklessness in sup-
port of A’s conduct. 
 To be sure, there are external procedural and constitutional problems 
with basing liability on uncharged theories. First, basing liability on an 
uncharged theory may violate a defendant’s due process right to fair no-
tice.252 Second, double jeopardy and collateral estoppel issues emerge. 
 As to fair notice, courts usually hold that the failure to formally 
charge a theory of liability entails no due process violation,253 in part 
because courts find that theories like aiding and abetting are always 
implicitly attached to every substantive count.254 But this seems prac-
tically inaccurate. Wright v. State, 255 a 1985 Nevada case, shows why. 
In that case, the defendant was arrested with two associates for rob-
bing a casino in Las Vegas.256 The defendant was ultimately convicted 
of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon.257 Early in the trial, the 
State’s evidence was that the defendant himself carried the weapon.258 
Well into the trial, however, one of the arrestees testified for the State 
that the defendant was outside in the car during the robbery and was 
not aware of the robbery until later.259 It was only during the closing 
argument that the prosecution adopted an aiding and abetting theory, 
arguing that the defendant was not in the casino during the robbery. 
The jury was then instructed on aiding and abetting.260 The Nevada Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the defendant’s right to notice of the 
aiding and abetting theory was violated. Indeed, Nevada is an exception 
in requiring that such a theory be alleged in the indictment.261 
                                                                                                                      
 251. In Nye & Nissen v. United States, the Supreme Court held that one could be charged 
with a substantive offense, but convicted on either a conspiracy / Pinkerton or aiding and 
abetting theory. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-20 (1949). 
 252. United States v. Lombardi, 138 F.3d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 253. United States v. Wrobel, 7 F. App’x. 723, 726 (9th Cir. 2001); State v. DeVerney, 
592 N.W.2d 837, 846 (Minn. 1999). 
 254. United States v. Foreman, 87 F. App’x 107, 110-11 (10th Cir. 2004); United States 
v. Walker, 621 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. White, No. 13-CR-10 JED, 
2015 WL 1809686, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 21, 2015). 
 255. 701 P.2d 743 (Nev. 1985). 
 256. Id. at 743. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 743-44. 
 260. Id. at 744. 
 261. Id. at 745 (holding that the indictment should provide other information “as to the 
specific acts on constituting the means of the aiding and abetting so as to afford the defend-
ant adequate notice to prepare his defense”). 
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 Double jeopardy262 and collateral estoppel issues263 may arise when 
aiding and abetting is charged as a crime, or is used as a theory of 
liability for another crime.264 
 As to double jeopardy, assume that the defendant in Wright was 
acquitted of armed robbery as a principal, despite the prosecution ar-
guing the aiding and abetting theory late in the trial. By arguing aid-
ing and abetting as a theory, rather than formally charging it, the 
prosecution would be able to charge the defendant in a later case for 
the crime of aiding and abetting.265 
 As to collateral estoppel, assume that the prosecution explicitly ad-
vanced a principle liability argument and that the implicit aiding and 
abetting theory was inherent. If the jury found the defendant not 
guilty, the prosecution would be precluded from relitigating the issue 
of whether the defendant was the principal in the armed robbery. It is 
not clear, however, that the prosecution would be barred from later 
charging the substantive crime of aiding and abetting.266 
D.   Charged Anticipator 
 “Charged anticipator” liability arises when a D could have antici-
pated A’s commission of a crime and is charged with a crime that con-
nects the D to the A. This classification includes four theories of liabil-
ity: Pinkerton liability where conspiracy,267 CCE,268 or RICO conspir-
acy269 are charged, and liability for the natural and probable conse-
quences of a conspiracy.270 These theories entail a D who is charged in 
                                                                                                                       
 262. See United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 154 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 263. United States v. Kalish, 780 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 264. United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 265. Double jeopardy prevents retrial for the same charge, not for a different charge 
based on the same evidence. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990); see also United States 
v. McCall, 298 Fed. App’x 591, 593-94 (9th Cir. 2008) (where jury in a first trial received 
instructions on co-conspirator and aiding and abetting liability, and prosecution failed to 
prove conspiracy liability, double jeopardy did not bar retrial on aiding and abetting theory); 
Ottomano v. United States, 468 F.2d 269, 271-72 (1st Cir. 1972) (no double jeopardy violation 
where D was acquitted of conspiracy to sell cocaine, and later charged with and convicted of 
selling cocaine on an aiding and abetting theory). 
 266. Christian v. Wellington, 739 F.3d 294, 300 (6th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. 
Kendrick, 98 Fed. App’x 692, 694 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[C]onspiracy and aiding and abetting are 
separate and distinct offenses, and an acquittal by general verdict on the conspiracy charge 
does not generally preclude retrial on an aiding-and-abetting charge.”); United States v. Nel-
son, 599 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he double jeopardy clause does not preclude pros-
ecution for aiding and abetting a substantive offense subsequent to an acquittal on a charge 
of conspiracy to commit that offense.”). 
 267. United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 873, 877 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 268. United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 999 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 269. United States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 437 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 270. Wesley M. Oliver, Limiting Criminal Law’s “In for a Penny, in for a Pound” Doc-
trine, 103 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 8, 9 (2013). 
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a joint criminal plan with A, where A commits a, which is not a goal of 
the joint plan but could have been anticipated by D. 
 The Pinkerton doctrine imposes liability on D for the conduct of co-
conspirator A where that conduct is reasonably foreseeable and in fur-
therance of the conspiracy.271 The natural and probable consequences 
test imposes the same liability where A’s a is a natural and probable 
consequence of the joint criminal plan. These doctrines have been 
equated to each other272 and are subject to the same analysis, and so I 
treat them interchangeably. 
 These theories are criticized for imposing liability based on an-
other’s criminal intent.273 But this is not necessarily so, since any 
agreement to commit a entails an implicit agreement to engage in con-
duct necessary to commit a.274 For example, if D and A agree to commit 
armed robbery of a bank, it seems uncontroversial that D should be 
liable for the armed robbery that A commits, but also for A’s illegal 
purchase of weapons, and probably also for A’s theft of a getaway car. 
 The critics of these doctrines respond not to the doctrines them-
selves, but to the virtually limitless extent of their application.275 
Where, however, the application of these doctrines is appropriately 
cabined, they appear quite justifiable. For example, the Ninth Circuit 
has held that Pinkerton liability does not reach defendants who play 
extremely minor roles in conspiracies.276 The Connecticut Supreme 
Court has found that Pinkerton does not apply where the nexus be-
tween the conduct in question and defendant is sufficiently remote.277 
And the Second Circuit has held that Pinkerton’s application in dis-
trict court is entirely discretionary.278  
                                                                                                                      
 271. United States v. Swiney, 203 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 272. Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 835 (D.C. 2006). 
 273. Kimberly R. Bird, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine: “Your Acts 
Are My Acts!,” 34 W. ST. U. L. REV. 43, 43 (2006); Matthew A. Pauley, The Pinkerton Doctrine 
and Murder, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 3 (2005). 
 274. The philosophers referred to in Part III recognize this. Bratman argues for joint 
planning agency not only for conduct agreed to by two or more people, but also for meshing 
“sub-plans.” BRATMAN, supra note 17, at 53. Margaret Gilbert finds that joint commitment 
entails an “obligation” to act “as appropriate to the shared intention in conjunction” with 
one’s cohorts. This means that each person is obliged to form “personal intentions that mesh 
appropriately with those of the other party or parties.” GILBERT, supra note 11, at 108-09. 
 275. United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 826-27 (7th Cir. 1991) (“When application 
of coconspirator liability is straightforward, a simple Pinkerton instruction may suffice. But 
as the proof of Pinkerton liability becomes more complex, the instruction must provide a 
higher degree of specificity . . . .” (citation omitted)). This is despite a purported due process 
limit on imposing liability for attenuated conduct. United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 
850 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 276. United States v. Bingham, 653 F.3d 983, 997 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 277. State v. Apodaca, 33 A.3d 224, 235 (Conn. 2012); State v. Coltherst, 820 A.2d 1024, 
1036 (Conn. 2003). 
 278. United States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900, 910 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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 Pinkerton and natural and probable consequences theories are not 
always justifiable, however, because they leave open the possibility 
that a D could be liable for negligently acting, or failing to act, to facil-
itate another’s criminal conduct—not recklessly acting, as the test for 
relational liability requires. 
 This is a possibility because these bases of liability do not clearly 
require any specific mens rea or actus reus. If negligence is defined 
around that which is reasonable, then Pinkerton suggests a negligence 
mens rea. But reasonableness language imports a negligence standard 
if the foreseeability is objective and may import a recklessness stand-
ard if the foreseeability is subjective to the D. 
 Furthermore, Pinkerton and natural and probable consequences re-
quire no actus reus requirement. Instead, they presume that all mem-
bers of a collective are responsible for certain conduct of other mem-
bers, regardless whether the liable member facilitated the conduct or 
otherwise acted.  
 Pinkerton and natural and probable consequences make it possible for 
a D to be liable where she was negligent and did not act in relation to a 
at all. In such cases, relational liability is unjustified. Where, however, 
the theories require at least reckless facilitation, they are defensible. 
E.   Uncharged Anticipator 
 “Uncharged anticipator” liability inheres where a D could have an-
ticipated A’s commission of a crime that A in fact committed, but D is 
not charged with a crime that connects D to A. This classification in-
cludes four theories of crime: Pinkerton liability where no conspiracy 
is charged,279 co-conspirator liability where no conspiracy is charged,280 
vicarious responsibility,281 and co-schemer theory.282 
 For example, both Pinkerton and co-conspirator liability may at-
tach where the trier of fact finds that a conspiracy involving D and A 
                                                                                                                       
 279. As, for example, where a D pleads guilty to attempted bank robbery and is convicted 
of using a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime, under Pinkerton, based on evidence that 
the A, not the D, used the firearm, even though conspiracy was not charged in the indict-
ment. United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 645-46, 648 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 280. Nickson v. Pliler, 400 Fed. App’x 209, 210 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is long and firmly 
established that an uncharged conspiracy may properly be used to prove criminal liability 
for acts of a coconspirator.” (quoting People v. Belmontes, 755 P.2d 310, 334 (Cal. 1988))). 
 281. Ferguson v. Estelle, 718 F.2d 730, 735-36 (5th Cir. 1983) (The “shared purpose to 
achieve jointly held illegal aims is the common thread among the diverse doctrines of vicar-
ious criminal responsibility.”). 
 282. United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Under ‘coschemer 
liability,’ a defendant who commits mail fraud is vicariously liable for all the acts of his co-
schemers in furtherance of the scheme, if the acts were reasonably foreseeable to the defend-
ant.” (citing United States v. Stapleton, 293 F.3d 1111, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2002))). 
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existed, whether or not a conspiracy was formally charged.283 Both of 
these forms of liability are internally justifiable for the same reason 
that uncharged assistor—realized liability is justifiable: because the 
inherent culpability of the D does not depend on the mechanism for 
determining liability. Of course, with this same internal justifiability 
come the same procedural and constitutional problems. 
 Theories of “vicarious responsibility”284 and “co-schemer” theory285 
appear to be less justifiable. Vicarious responsibility expands upon 
Pinkerton by maintaining the “in furtherance” requirement but drop-
ping the “reasonable foreseeability” requirement.286 This explicitly jet-
tisons any mens rea requirement, thus violating the test for relational 
liability. “Co-schemer” theory may be closely related in relevant parts 
to Pinkerton liability,287 but it has also been treated as true guilt by 
association, with no requisite actus reus or mens rea on the part of the 
D.288 It has also been used as a catch-all theory of liability, applicable 
where conspiracy liability may fail.289 Co-schemer theory is, therefore, 
defensible only if it tracks recklessness-based Pinkerton liability. 
F.   Charged Assistor—Unrealized 
 “Charged assistor—unrealized” liability attaches to a D who is 
charged with a crime that connects her to A, where A’s alleged crime 
is not charged or where A has been acquitted. This classification in-
cludes aiding and abetting liability where the crime aided and abetted 
                                                                                                                      
 283. Zackery, 494 F.3d at 646; United States v. Rubenacker, 39 M.J. 970, 971-72 
(A.F.C.M.R. 1994). 
 284. United States v. Bernard, 287 F.2d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 1961) (imposing liability on 
“all joint venturers for all acts done and statements made in furtherance of the object of the 
joint scheme or undertaking”). 
 285. United States v. Stapleton, 293 F.3d 1111, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2002); Baker v. United 
States, 115 F.2d 533, 540 (8th Cir. 1940) (“The evidence conclusively shows that [the defend-
ant] was a party to the scheme and even though a conspiracy is not charged, yet when such 
a scheme is clearly participated in by more than one individual, it constitutes in and of itself 
a conspiracy.”). 
 286. Bernard, 287 F.2d at 719. 
 287. Stapleton, 293 F.3d at 1115. 
 288. Baker, 115 F.2d at 540. 
 289. Reuben v. United States, 86 F.2d 464, 468-69 (7th Cir. 1936) (“The defendants are 
not charged in the indictment with violation of the conspiracy statute, but they are charged 
in apt terms with a unity of purpose and action in the alleged scheme to defraud and the use 
of the mails. . . . One or more persons can originate and carry out a scheme to defraud and 
any number of persons can operate the plan, each doing his part after the machinery is put 
in motion; and it would be of no consequence that each and all did not actively participate in 
the several acts of mailing if each were aiding and advising in the furtherance of the scheme. 
While defendants were not charged with or tried for the specific offense of conspiracy, the 
charges and proof herein very strongly supported many of the elements of conspiracy, such 
as the asserted common scheme, the harmony of the actors, and their concert of action.”). 
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is not charged or is acquitted290 and conspiracy liability where the 
crime envisioned by the conspiracy is not charged or is acquitted.291  
 The justificatory basis for these theories is that each D is liable for 
her own intent and conduct, whether or not the a envisioned came to 
be.292 This makes sense where a D is charged with aiding and abetting 
A, since the D is charged based on her own intent to assist and conduct 
of assisting. 
 This theory also supports D’s conspiracy liability where A is not 
charged with conspiracy but the trier-of-fact finds that such a conspir-
acy existed. Where an A is not charged with a crime, but D is charged 
with aiding and abetting A or conspiring with A, legitimate exercises 
in prosecutorial discretion may be at work. For example, A may be co-
operating with law enforcement officials. Or A may have never com-
pleted any envisioned criminal act, but D’s intent to assist A made D 
much more culpable than A. 
 Less justifiable would be D’s conviction for conspiracy in jurisdic-
tions that require two or more people to commit conspiracy293 and D’s 
sole alleged co-conspirator has been acquitted of conspiracy. In such 
cases the trier-of-fact would have found that the prosecution failed to 
prove an agreement beyond a reasonable doubt, which is, in these ju-
risdictions, an element of conspiracy.294 With insufficient proof of a bi-
lateral agreement should come an acquittal for conspiracy. 
 It might, however, make sense to charge a D—and no one else—
with conspiracy in jurisdictions that permit a one-person conspiracy.295 
It might also make sense that in jurisdictions that require two or more 
people to commit conspiracy, only one person could be charged (again, 
                                                                                                                       
 290. Lugo v. United States, No. 09-cv-00696-NG, 2014 WL 7140456, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 
12, 2014) (defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting his brother’s crime, even though 
his brother was acquitted). 
 291. United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 40 (4th Cir. 1990) (The defendant’s conspir-
acy conviction was affirmed, even though his sole alleged co-conspirator was acquitted. The 
court rejected the inconsistent verdict claim, observing, “[e]nough evidence exists of a con-
spiracy between [the defendants] to uphold the jury’s verdict . . . .”). 
 292. United States v. Standefer, No. 78-1909, 1979 WL 4863, at *2-3 (3d Cir. Feb. 9, 
1979) (“It is not necessary that the actual principal be tried or convicted, nor is it material 
that the actual principal has been acquitted . . . . Each participant in an illegal venture is 
required to ‘stand on his own two feet.’  ”). 
 293. As 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994) requires. In contrast, in New York one person may commit 
the crime of conspiracy. There is no required meeting of the minds with a second conspirator. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.30 (MCKINNEY 2017).  
 294. Such liability would also contradict the philosophers’ opinion that collective respon-
sibility requires joint commitment. BRATMAN, supra note 17, at 50; GILBERT, supra note 11, 
at 89. The contrary argument is raised by Christopher Kutz, who might base relational lia-
bility on an individual’s “participatory intention,” which is housed in the individual as “an 
intention to act as part of a group.” KUTZ, supra note 18, at 67. 
 295. See N.Y. PENAL CODE § 105.30 (MCKINNEY 2017). 
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based on prosecutorial discretion or relative culpability). The norma-
tive boundaries of these charges will depend upon one’s epistemic in-
terpretation of a jury acquittal and failure to charge. If an acquittal or 
failure to charge means that an A did not commit the conspiracy in 
question, then a D who is said to be in a conspiracy with that A cannot, 
by definition, be in a conspiracy. But if an acquittal means that the 
conspiracy charge against A was not proven, there may space for a jury 
nevertheless to hold D responsible for conspiracy. 
G.   Compound 
 “Compound” liability attaches to a D through the applied combina-
tion of two or more theories of liability. Many of the theories of liability 
discussed above have been combined to produce four types of  
compound liability. 
 First, a D who aids and abets a conspiracy may be treated as a co-
conspirator for any subsequent Pinkerton liability.296 In one case, for 
example, D aided and abetted A’s substantive drug charges.297 A was 
part of a drug conspiracy.298 D’s jury received a Pinkerton instruction, 
allowing D to be found guilty for the substantive acts of the conspiracy 
through Pinkerton, even though D was never found to be a part of the 
conspiracy.299 This combination is indefensible from theoretical, retrib-
utivist, and procedural standpoints.300  
 Theoretically, while the D may be liable for the conspiracy itself 
because she aided and abetted it, she should not be liable for conduct 
arising from the conspiracy. This is so because Pinkerton and natural 
and probable consequences should assume that the crime in question 
                                                                                                                      
 296. United States v. Vazquez-Castro, 640 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (defendant charged 
with conspiracy on an aiding and abetting theory, found guilty of a substantive charge on a 
Pinkerton theory); United States v. Labbous Nos. 94-6169, 94-6181, 1996 WL 166691, at *4 
(6th Cir. Apr. 8, 1996) (“A Pinkerton charge, that all members of a conspiracy are responsible 
for acts committed by the other members, is appropriate even when the Defendant is charged 
with aiding and abetting.”); United States v. Gonzalez, 933 F.2d 417, 446 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(“Even if a jury had found only that [the defendant] ‘aided or abetted’ the conspiracy, there 
is nothing that would have prevented it from also determining that [he] aided or abetted the 
substantive crimes of his co-conspirators.”); United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 309-10 
(7th Cir. 1984). But see Gonzales, 933 F.2d, at 445. 
 297. United States v. Comeaux, 955 F.2d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 298. Id. at 588. 
 299. Id. at 591; see also United States v. Jarvis, 335 Fed. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(A defendant who aids and abets a conspiracy is “criminally responsible for the [conspiracy] 
to the same extent as the person who he assisted.”). 
 300. See United States v. Miller, 552 F. Supp. 827, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (“When aiding 
and abetting principles are combined with those of conspiracy, the law approaches the outer 
limits of culpability based upon complicity.”). 
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was reasonably foreseeable to a conspirator,301 who is presumed—by 
virtue of her status as a conspirator—to have a requisite level of 
knowledge regarding the conspiracy and its likely products such that 
she can be said to intend, know of, and facilitate, or act recklessly in 
regard to those consequences by participating in the conspiracy. The 
same presumption should not be applied to non-conspirators—even if 
they aid and abet the conspiracy. 
 This outcome also fails to satisfy retributivist principles. The test 
for relational liability limits the applicability of Pinkerton and natural 
and probable consequences to those D’s who themselves act or fail to 
act in relation to a crime. A D who aids and abets a conspiracy acts in 
relation to the crime of conspiracy, but not to any other conduct result-
ing from the conspiracy. This theory, therefore, holds that D is liable 
for an act that D did not intend or cause, and whose action vis-à-vis 
the crime is quite attenuated.302 
 This result is also procedurally problematic. The law appears to 
permit Pinkerton liability to stand in where evidence supporting an 
aiding and abetting conviction is absent.303 This is possible because 
Pinkerton and aiding and abetting are theories of liability that may or 
may not be formally charged in an indictment. Therefore, a D who is 
charged under a conspiracy / Pinkerton theory that the jury does not 
adopt may still be convicted under an aiding and abetting theory. In 
turn, a D who is charged under an aiding and abetting theory (either 
as a theory or as a substantive crime) that the jury does not adopt may 
still be convicted under a conspiracy / Pinkerton theory.304 
                                                                                                                       
 301. United States v. Fonseca-Caro, 114 F.3d 906, 907 (9th Cir. 1997) (Under Pinkerton, 
“a co-conspirator is vicariously liable for reasonably foreseeable substantive crimes commit-
ted by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy.”). 
 302. One can be charged with aiding and abetting the formation of a conspiracy, even 
before the conspiracy exists. United States v. Portac, Inc., 869 F.2d 1288, 1291-93 (9th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Ammons, 682 F. Supp. 1332, 1339 (W.D.N.C. 1988). One can also aid 
and abet conduct that counts as predicate acts for a RICO conspiracy, and thereby be con-
victed of the conspiracy itself. United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 832 (2d Cir. 1989). The 
same goes for aiding and abetting crimes that are predicates for a CCE conviction. United 
States v. Miskinis, 966 F.2d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 
259 (2d Cir. 1988); see also State v. Coltherst, 820 A.2d 1024, 1036 (Conn. 2003); GILBERT, 
supra note 11, at 80 (“[A]ny steps directed against a blameworthy collective must be taken 
with extreme caution, on pain of harming numerous individuals who have little or nothing 
to answer for in connection with that collective’s action.”); KUTZ, supra note 117, at 221. 
 303. United States v. Myrie, 479 Fed. App’x 898, 903 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 304. Zackery, 494 F.3d at 649; People v. Robinson, 715 N.W.2d 44, 48-50 (Mich. 2006); 
People v. Moreno, No. B144016, 2002 WL 31045375, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2002). In 
Commonwealth v. DeCillis, the defendant was acquitted of conspiracy to destroy a state po-
lice building. He was then charged with the substantive crime of destroying the building. 
The Commonwealth planned to use the very same evidence as it had during the conspiracy 
trial, but proceed on a joint venture theory, since it “had insufficient evidence as to which of 
the participants actually broke the window and placed the bomb inside” of the building. 
Commonwealth v. DeCillis, 669 N.E.2d 1087, 1088 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). The appellate court 
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 The second theory entails liability for the substantive offense envi-
sioned by a conspiracy (and not other reasonably expected but unin-
tended criminal conduct, subject to a Pinkerton analysis) where the D 
merely aided and abetted the conspiracy (and was not a co-conspira-
tor).305 This theory is defensible because the D will have aided and 
abetted a plan to commit a crime. The D, therefore, will have intended 
to facilitate the commission of that crime, satisfying prong one of the 
test for relational liability. 
 The third theory consists of aiding and abetting the predicate acts for 
a RICO conspiracy or CCE, in order to ground liability for the RICO 
conspiracy306 or CCE itself.307 This theory is indefensible because the D’s 
intent and action extends only to the predicate act, not to the conspiracy 
of which the act is a component. In assisting the predicate act, there is 
no indication that the D knows of the conspiracy or intends to facilitate 
it (if there is, then the D should be charged with aiding and abetting the 
conspiracy). In the absence of knowledge about the conspiracy, the de-
fendant cannot be said to be reckless as regards the conspiracy. 
 The fourth theory entails applying a “joint venture” theory of liabil-
ity to a second prosecution, where a D was acquitted of conspiracy dur-
ing a first prosecution, and the joint venture theory is based on the 
very same evidence as the conspiracy charge.308 This theory is inter-
nally defensible if the joint venture theory itself satisfies the test for 
relational liability, but has external procedural and constitutional 
problems involving collateral estoppel and double jeopardy. 
V.   EXTERNAL FAILURES 
 The structure of relational liability often has suffered misplaced 
criticism because the critics aim their fire at the internal structure but 
make arguments about external failures.309 To be sure, these external 
                                                                                                                      
upheld the prosecution, holding that acquittal of a substantive offense does not preclude 
subsequent prosecution for conspiracy, and acquittal of conspiracy does not preclude subse-
quent prosecution on a substantive crime charge—even if the theory of liability closely tracks 
that of the theory that originally failed. Id. at 1088-89. 
 305. United States v. Kasvin, 757 F.2d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1985) (Seventh Circuit affirmed 
a conviction based on jury instructions that “[o]ne can aid and abet a conspiracy without 
necessarily participating in the original agreement,” and “[n]o fatal amendment to an indict-
ment occurs where a defendant may have been convicted as a principal in a conspiracy by 
aiding and abetting it even though he was not charged with aiding and abetting in the orig-
inal indictment.”). 
 306. United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 832 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 307. United States v. Barajas-Diaz, 313 F.3d 1242, 1246 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002).  
 308. DeCillis, 669 N.E.2d. at 1088.  
 309. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 648, 650 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing Pinkerton for its expansive application and ease of proof as well as facilitation of 
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failures mean that relational liability is often imposed where there is 
no culpability. Reform efforts, however, must be based on an accurate 
structural evaluation and targeted where reform is most needed.  
 This Article’s theoretical critique in favor of relational criminal lia-
bility, therefore, must be balanced against practical limitations. Rela-
tional liability in the real world is often just too vaguely seen,310 or its 
evidence just too unreliable,311 to provide the basis for criminal liabil-
ity. In addition, a defendant’s legal liability may rest on such an atten-
uated relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the bad out-
come that the value of relational liability for retributivist and deter-
rence aims is fatally undermined.312 These practical, external argu-
ments fall into three primary categories: the initiation of formal crim-
inal charges, the often illusory limits of certain bases of liability, and 
the fact that many bases of liability assume equal culpability be-
tween—and provide equal punishment for—D’s and the A’s who actu-
ally perform a. 
A.   Formal Criminal Charges 
 For two reasons, formal charging instruments such as indictments 
and informations can present procedural and constitutional problems 
that affect the imposition of relational liability.  
 First, while prosecutors must charge a crime in these instruments, 
in federal jurisdictions they do not need to state their theories of lia-
bility in them.313 Consider again the facts in Wright v. State,314 in 
which the D was charged with armed robbery and was tried on the 
theory that he actually committed the robbery.315 At the end of the 
trial, however, the prosecutor argued, for the first time, the D’s liability 
                                                                                                                       
excessively broad prosecutorial discretion); Dressler, supra note 243, at 433 (criticizing re-
gimes of equal liability between principals and accomplices); Goldstein, supra note 224, at 
406-07 (highlighting the evidentiary difficulty in determining a conspiracy defendant’s mens rea). 
 310. Peter Margulies, Guantanamo by Other Means: Conspiracy Prosecutions and Law 
Enforcement Dilemmas After September 11, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 513, 541 (2007-2008). 
 311. Kevin Jon Heller, Note, Whatever Happened to Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Of 
Drug Conspiracies, Overt Acts, and United States v. Shabani, 49 STAN. L. REV. 111, 111 (1996). 
 312. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798-800 (1982) (White, J., plurality opinion). 
 313. United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 646 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[J]ust as criminal lia-
bility based on aiding and abetting does not need to be specified in the indictment, criminal 
liability based on Pinkerton does not have to be specified in the indictment.” (quoting United 
States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1987)); United States v. Stapleton, 293 F.3d 1111, 
1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[V]icarious liability for substantive counts . . . does not require that 
the indictment charge conspiracy.”); United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 878 (11th Cir. 
1985); United States v. Olweiss, 138 F.2d 798, 800 (2d Cir. 1943). 
 314. 701 P.2d 743 (Nev. 1985). 
 315. Id. at 744. 
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as a mere aider and abettor.316 Had the D been aware that this argu-
ment might be made, his defense could have looked quite different.317 
 Second, the label given to collectives or to the theory of liability—
conspiracy, aiding and abetting, joint venture, scheme, Pinkerton, and 
so forth—mean little because the labels do not import any application 
of distinct law, nor do they offer meaningful limits. Instead, all of these 
labels function to link a D to an A through a purposive collective and 
impose relational liability.318 Predictable legal structures, with ele-
ments that prosecutors must meet and defense counselors know ahead 
of time they must challenge, virtually do not exist. Rather, much of 
relational liability allows prosecutors to shape charges and evidence to 
their own purposes.319 
 There are four procedural or constitutional problems arising from 
this situation, all of which, to be sure, have failed in court or have not 
been tested. 
                                                                                                                      
 316. Id. 
 317. The prosecution could have argued for liability based on a conspiracy theory as well, 
to much the same prejudicial effect. Garcia v. Foulk, No. C 13–05237 BLF (PR), 2015 WL 
2148031, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2015) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus where jury 
was instructed that it could convict a defendant of murder on any of four theories: “(1) he 
was the actual perpetrator or an aider and abettor in the commission or [sic] murder or the 
lesser include[d] offenses; (2) he aided and abetted assault with a deadly weapon and murder 
was a natural and probable consequence of the assault; (3) he aided and abetted brandishing 
a firearm, and murder was a natural and probable consequence of brandishing a firearm; or 
(4) he conspired to commit the crimes of brandishing a firearm or assault with a deadly 
weapon, and murder was perpetrated by a co-conspirator in furtherance of that conspiracy 
and was a natural and probable consequence of the agreed upon criminal objective of that 
conspiracy” (citations omitted)); Tomas v. Roe, No. 97–CV–0762 TW(LAB), 1998 WL 
1045306, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 1998) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus where 
the “prosecutor proceeded on alternative theories of vicarious liability based on an un-
charged conspiracy to commit the robberies and aiding and abetting in those robberies.” The 
court denied the petition because it was well-settled that “an uncharged conspiracy may 
properly be used to prove criminal liability for acts of a coconspirator”). 
 318. Coplin v. United States, 88 F.2d 652, 660-61 (9th Cir. 1937) (“When it is established 
that persons are associated together to accomplish a crime or series of crimes, . . . . [i]t is not 
the name by which such a combination is known that matters, but whether such persons are 
working together to accomplish a common result.” (quoting 16 C.J. § 1283, at 646) (emphasis 
omitted)); United States v. Black, 526 F. Supp. 2d 870, 883 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“As a general 
rule, co-venturers in a criminal scheme—whether labeled as co-schemers, co-conspirators, or 
aiders and abettors—are jointly and severally liable for all proceeds generated under a fraud 
scheme.”); United States v. Dukow, 330 F. Supp. 360, 364 (W.D. Penn. 1971) (“When two or 
more parties are found to have joined in a common scheme, all are responsible for the acts 
and declarations of each co-schemer in furtherance of the scheme while it is in progress, and 
this is so regardless of whether conspiracy is charged in the indictment. When a common 
scheme has been found to exist, the general rules of agency regarding joint liability are ap-
plied as a matter of evidence in determining guilt on the substantive counts.”). 
 319. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 447 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(“[C]hameleon-like” evidence of a conspiracy “takes on a special coloration from each of the 
many independent offenses on which it may be overlaid.”). 
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 First, defendants may not receive fair notice of the charges they 
face. Prosecutors can introduce novel theories of liability, even late in 
the trial.320 And courts have virtually foreclosed the possibility of a suc-
cessful due process argument because variance (or constructive 
amendment) is the basis for a fair notice claim, and variance arises 
only when new charges, not new theories of liability, emerge during 
the course of trial.321 
 Second, the right against double jeopardy may be violated, or at 
least stressed. Although most courts have rejected double jeopardy 
claims based on multiple theories of liability, others have expressed 
concern.322 For example, a single criminal agreement can give rise to 
multiple conspiracy charges.323 Both a RICO conspiracy and a CCE, for 
example, can be charged separately.324 Furthermore, either one of 
these charges can be based upon a theory of conspiracy or of aiding and 
abetting the conspiracy.325 And even where a conspiracy charge has 
been dismissed, a defendant may still be liable for a substantive crime 
through Pinkerton liability.326 
 Third, prosecutors may alter theories of liability to suit their evolv-
ing needs throughout trial.327 The Second Circuit, for example, has 
held that in RICO conspiracy cases “it is irrelevant whether a defend-
ant agrees to commit the racketeering acts as a principal or as an aider 
and abettor.”328 But it surely is relevant to a defendant who proceeds 
through pre-trial discovery, motions practice, and trial as though she 
were alleged to be a principal, only to hear the prosecutor argue for the 
                                                                                                                       
 320. United States v. Wrobel, 7 Fed. App’x 723, 724-26 (9th Cir. 2002) (Defendant con-
victed for wire fraud; conviction sustainable under a Pinkerton, aiding and abetting, or prin-
cipal theory); United States v. Bernard, 287 F.2d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 1961) (Defendant charged 
with tax evasion, evidence admitted on the theory of vicarious liability); People v. Williams, 
302 P.2d 393, 395 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (Defendant charged as a principal, but convicted 
on a theory of co-conspirator liability). 
 321. United States v. Vazquez-Castro, 640 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Ashley, 606 F.3d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 322. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1006 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he Blockberger 
test ‘is not easily applied to complex conspiracy prosecutions.’ ” (quoting United States v. 
Solano, 605 F.2d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1979))). 
 323. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 336-38 (1981); Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1007. 
 324. Phillips, 644 F.2d at 1014. 
 325. United States v. Cowart, 595 F.2d 1023, 1031 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 326. United States v. Chairez, 33 F.3d 823, 824, 828 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 327. United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 825 n.3 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Both defendants 
objected to the Pinkerton instruction during trial. At first the instruction was discussed by 
counsel and the district judge as if it were offered to facilitate the codefendants’ conviction 
for the RICO conspiracy violation. When pressed by defense counsel as to whether combining 
a Pinkerton instruction with a RICO conspiracy charge would be permissible, the govern-
ment apparently altered its strategy, claiming alternatively that the instruction was proper 
to allow the jury to convict Morgan Finley of the substantive acts of his alleged coconspirator, 
Michael Lambesis.” (citation omitted)). 
 328. United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 832 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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first time in closing argument that she may be convicted as an aider 
and abettor.329 
 Fourth, the grand jury’s authority to define charges is undermined. 
For example, a grand jury might issue an indictment for a substantive 
crime based on evidence that the D conspired to commit the crime. If, 
however, the prosecutor’s conspiracy theory weakens with the post-in-
dictment development of evidence, the prosecutor can easily switch to 
an aiding and abetting, vicarious liability, or some other theory of lia-
bility.330 Similarly, a D might be indicted for a substantive crime but 
convicted for the conduct of others on a conspiracy theory (where con-
spiracy is uncharged).331 In these cases, it is unknown whether the 
original grand jury would have signed off on the charges based on 
these other theories of liability because the standards of proof of each 
are different.332 
B.   Illusory Limits 
 The structure of relational liability entails various limits to liabil-
ity. In practice, however, these limits are often illusory. For example, 
courts have doubted the value and definition of Pinkerton liability, 333 
and line drawing for aiding and abetting is a dubious endeavor.334  
 Combining Pinkerton and aiding and abetting concepts generates 
additional confusion. In United States v. Davis,335 a defendant was 
                                                                                                                      
 329. Wright v. State, 701 P.2d 743, 744-45 (Nev. 1985). 
 330. United States v. Stapleton, 293 F.3d 1111, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2002). Some states 
restrict this practice. See State v. Farrington, No. A-3398-05T4, 2010 WL 2010935, at *2 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 20, 2010); People v. Castro, No. 2657-2001, 2002 WL 1899928, 
at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 2002); Smith v. State No. W2012–00509–CCA–R3–HC, 2013 WL 
5493549, at *1 (Tenn Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2013). 
 331. People v. Williams, 302 P.2d 393, 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (Defendant was “respon-
sible as a principal for everything done by his co-conspirators, and the fact that a conspiracy 
was not alleged in the indictment is immaterial.”). 
 332. United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 333. One court lamented that Pinkerton “is not a usual criminal law concept [but is im-
ported from negligence law] and surely not a concept that puts meaningful due process limits 
on criminal liability.” United States v. Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67 n.3 (D. Mass. 2003). 
The Seventh Circuit has expressed that “the value of [a Pinkerton] instruction[] in the RICO 
context is questionable.” United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 504 n.7 (7th Cir. 1986). 
It also has questioned whether Pinkerton “really adds anything besides complication, given 
the possibility of basing liability on aiding and abetting.” United States v. Manzella, 791 
F.2d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 334. United States v. Messer, 900 F.2d 260, *3 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Drawing an exact line of 
sufficient participation [in a scheme for aiding and abetting purposes] . . . is difficult if not 
impossible.” (quoting Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954))); United States v. 
Kasvin, 757 F.2d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 1985) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (noting that aiding and 
abetting liability could extend to a drug addict who makes purchases from a drug conspiracy 
for personal use). 
 335. 154 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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charged with aiding and abetting the use of a firearm.336 The jury was 
instructed that it could convict based on either an aiding and abetting 
or Pinkerton theory.337 The Eighth Circuit found no error, implying 
that aiding and abetting was a broader concept of liability that encom-
passes Pinkerton liability. Therefore, if any juror found the defendant 
liable on an aiding and abetting theory, then the juror would certainly 
find him liable under a Pinkerton theory.338 
 That is incorrect because each theory requires proof of unique ele-
ments. Pinkerton liability requires reasonable foreseeability and, some-
times, an act in furtherance of the conspiracy.339 Aiding and abetting re-
quires proof of specific intent to assist and actual assistance of the crime 
in question. One theory does not encompass the other; claiming that it 
does undermines the grand jury’s authority (which might have signed off 
on an indictment based on one theory but not another) and risks convic-
tion with jury unanimity and proof of every necessary element.340 
 Furthermore, when courts apply both Pinkerton and aiding and 
abetting theories to one criminal charge, they alternately distinguish 
the two theories in order to provide the jury with two unique theories 
of liability, each of which is able to stand on its own if the other fails,341 
but they equate them in order to avoid the problem of non-unanimous 
verdicts, as in Davis, above.342 This combination of theories, of course, 
raises the problem of multiplicity, pursuant to which a defendant may 
be convicted on multiple counts that in fact comprise fewer crimes.343 
                                                                                                                       
 336. Id. at777. 
 337. Id. at 782. 
 338. Id. at 783. 
 339. 19 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) requires an overt act, but other federal conspiracy statutes 
do not. Title 21 drug conspiracies, for example, require no overt act, United States v. 
Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11 (1994); United States v. Pumphrey, 831 F.2d 307, 308 (D.C. Cir. 
1987), nor do some conspiracies to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion, see 18 U.S.C. §2339B (2006); United States v. Abdi, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1064 (S.D. 
Ohio 2007), nor conspiracies to commit money laundering, Whitfield v. United States, 543 
U.S. 209, 211 (2005). 
 340. See United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210, 1220-21 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 341. United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is well settled that, 
‘[e]ven in the absence of evidence supporting an aiding and abetting conviction, persons in-
dicted as aiders and abettors may be convicted pursuant to a Pinkerton instruction.’ ” (quot-
ing United States v. Comeaux, 955 F.2d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 1992))). 
 342. United States v. Davis, 154 F.3d 772, 783 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is doubtful, under 
the facts of this case, that a jury member found a defendant guilty of aiding and abetting in 
the use or carrying of a firearm but would not have found that defendant culpable under 
Pinkerton. If any juror who found the defendants guilty of directly aiding and abetting would 
also find the defendants vicariously liable, then no unanimity problem exists because all of 
the jurors would have at least agreed on the Pinkerton theory of guilt.”). 
 343. For example, in a different United States v. Davis, the defendant was charged with 
conspiracy to commit rape and two counts of rape. It appears that the defendant did not 
actually rape the victim; instead, he assisted another in doing so. United States v. Davis, No. 
NMCM 9901170, 2003 WL 1537674, at *1-2 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 2003). He was, 
however, found guilty of two counts of rape: on one count because he conspired with the 
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C.   Equal Culpability 
 With the exception of accessory after the fact, relational liability 
generally assumes equal culpability between Ds and As even where D 
didn’t act to cause a but is held responsible for A’s doing a. The philos-
ophers of collective responsibility reject this premise in practice, just 
as Yaffe does in theory. Kutz, for example, would require an individual 
accounting of liability, even in a collective context.344 Bratman 
acknowledges the existence of relationships of “asymmetric authority,” 
in which authority to act or make decisions is not equally apportioned 
among members of a collective and which therefore calls for individu-
alized assessments of liability.345 And Gilbert observes that equal lia-
bility will unfairly harm members of collectives who “have little or 
nothing to answer for in connection with that collective’s action.”346 
Comparative culpability principles of retributivism would also suggest 
that an A who performs a is, by virtue of that performance and all 
other things being equal, more culpable than the non-acting D.347 
 Where equal liability regimes exist, courts may be unable to assign 
less culpability to D relative to A where D is truly less culpable and may 
also be unable to assign more liability to a relatively more culpable D.  
 To the first point, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, some state 
guidelines, and mandatory minimum sentences limit judges’ authority 
to assign individualized culpability. In the federal system, if two de-
fendants are charged with murder, where one is the principal and the 
other aided and abetted the principal, both defendants will be assigned 
the offense level for murder.348 While a D’s relative role in the offense 
will aggravate or mitigate her sentence,349 the difference is unlikely to 
allow for condign punishment in many cases. Where the charge is mur-
der, the aiding and abetting D’s base offense level will be 43,350 which, 
                                                                                                                      
rapist to commit the crime, and on another count because he aided and abetted the rape. Id. 
at *2-3. In another case, a defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting an attempted first-
degree murder, conspiring to commit the murder, aiding and abetting an aggravated rob-
bery, and conspiracy to commit the robbery. State v. Mincey, 963 P.2d 403, 405 (Kan. 1998). 
The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the convictions, holding that aiding and abetting and 
conspiracy have different elements, and are therefore not multiplicitous. Id. at 410. 
 344. KUTZ, supra note 117, at 49 (“Agents are often said to warrant mitigated responses 
because they bear only a small degree of responsibility for a harm, or to be largely responsible 
and hence deserving of especially hard treatment.”).  
 345. BRATMAN, supra note 115, at 85. 
 346. GILBERT, supra note 59, at 80. 
 347. Dressler, supra note 243, at 433. 
 348. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2X2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (For 
aiding and abetting, “The offense level is the same level as that for the underlying offense.”). 
 349. §§ 3B1.1-2. 
 350. § 2A1.1. 
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assuming no other relevant facts, generates a sentence of life.351 A D 
who was a minimal participant in the murder will enjoy a four-point 
reduction in her offense level,352 with a recommended sentence range of 
262-327 months (21.8 to 27.25 years), and up to life if the D has a crim-
inal history.353 While a judge may find that the aider and abettor is less 
culpable than the actual murderer, the judge will often be discour-
aged354—or, where mandatory minimums operate, prevented—from 
mitigating the aider and abettor’s sentence to the appropriate length. 
 To the second point, theories of relational liability can be used to 
impose more culpability on a non-acting D, but they may present ad-
ditional procedural problems. In United States v. Benabe,355 for exam-
ple, a defendant was convicted of participating in a RICO conspiracy.356 
Pinkerton was not used to determine guilt at trial but was used to de-
termine the defendant’s sentence for, in part, four murders he was not 
charged with at trial.357 Although the Seventh Circuit mentioned its con-
cern with using Pinkerton in the RICO conspiracy context, it found no 
error, writing that Pinkerton or aiding and abetting theories could be 
used at sentencing just as they are used at trial to determine guilt.358 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 In 1998, George Fletcher contended that “[w]e no longer think 
solely in terms of individuals acting solely on their own account but of 
groups of people interacting in order to produce a crime of shared re-
sponsibility.”359 He posed two important questions: are only individu-
als liable for a crime, and should we hold an entire group liable as a 
group for the crime?360 
 In this Article, I have argued that while individuals do act in collec-
tives, they are ultimately liable as individuals. Flowing from that, we 
should not hold an entire group liable as a group. To answer these 
questions in any other way would upend American criminal law 
                                                                                                                       
 351. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 
 352. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 
 353. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 
 354. Because, on appeal, sentences within Guideline ranges are presumed reasonable, 
United States v. Brantman, 341 Fed. App’x 38, 39 (5th Cir. 2009), and courts imposing sen-
tences outside these ranges must defend their decisions. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 
U.S. 81 (1996). Different standards of review for Guideline sentences and sentences that 
depart from the Guidelines may further discourage departures. See United States v. Reed, 
146 Fed. App’x 947, 950-51 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 355. 654 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 356. Id. at 756. 
 357. Id. at 777. 
 358. Id. at 777-78. 
 359. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 189. 
 360. Id. 
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norms, generate problems of proof and retributivist justice, and lead 
to unacceptable guilt by association. 
 Fletcher’s questions abide in importance, even after more than 
twenty-five years of philosophy on collective intentionality and 
Fletcher’s recognition of a collective turn in our thinking because crim-
inal law theory has never recognized relational liability as a special 
part of criminal law. This liability has remained undertheorized and 
untested and has therefore been the target of misplaced criticism. 
 To clarify this area and normatively assess it, this Article has assumed 
an individual accounting, premised on an evaluation of each collective 
member’s mens rea and actus reus. It rejects collectivist arguments as 
unclear, anti-retributivist, and gateways to guilt by association. 
 To be sure, there is less daylight between individualist and collec-
tivist camps than initially appears. For example, Bratman, Gilbert, 
and Kutz contend with some type of collective reification, and Yaffe 
and Ohlin acknowledge the practical need for some individualist ac-
counting of liability. 
 This Article mediates the debate by advancing an individualist ac-
count of relational liability. This account responds to the collectivists 
by accepting the practical reality of collective conduct and determining 
individual liability in light of that reality. It responds to traditional 
criminal law norms by locating liability squarely in the individual.  
 It also helps to resolve the debate by addressing the concerns of 
both camps. As to the collectivists, Yaffe’s concern with the fiction that 
D is held to have committed a crime, when A in fact committed it, is 
avoided, since D and A are considered on their own. And Ohlin’s con-
cern with imposing too much liability (if collectivism leads to vicarious 
liability) or no liability (if group intent, not individual intent, is at-
tended to) is resolved for the same reason. As to the individualists, 
Bratman’s, Gilbert’s, and Kutz’s attention to the reality of groups is 
brought on board since relational liability judges individuals in the 
group context. Their accounts regarding when an individual should be 
relationally liable are also attended to and given expression that is 
practically applicable in criminal law. 
 In the end, an individualist account of relational liability has many 
salutary implications. It treats individuals as individuals, even when 
they act in groups; it degrades the possibility of guilt by association; it 
is globally applicable (and not only to, say, Ohlin’s “tightly-knit” con-
spiracies); and it avoids reliance on the fiction of equal liability that 
concerns Yaffe. 
 
